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UNIVERSITY  OF CHICAGO  AND NBER,  VISITING  HOOVER  INSTITUTION 
Wage  and  Employment  Patterns  in 
Long-Term  Contracts  When  Labor  Is 
Quasi-Fixed 
I. Introduction 
Wage rigidities have played a central role in non-market-clearing explana- 
tions  for  sizable  business  cycles.1  The  reason  for  this  is  presumably 
empirical. Many persons  have their wage  rates adjusted only once each 
year; and  in collective  agreements,  which  are particularly prevalent  in 
industries  with  high-employment  variability, it  is  common  for  wage 
rates  to  be  renegotiated  only  every  two  or three  years.  Within  these 
agreements  indexation  is very limited.2 
Wage  rigidity  need  not  imply  more  variable employment-that  de- 
pends  on how  employment  is chosen  given  the wage  behavior and on 
the  nature  of  disturbances  to the  market.  It has  traditionally been  as- 
sumed  that firms choose  employment  unilaterally within  the term of a 
labor contract, maximizing  profits subject to the rigid wage.3 Behavior in 
actual contracts  is often  cited  in support  of this assumption.  The twin 
assumptions  of a rigid real wage and employment  chosen unilaterally by 
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1. This was  true before  the General  Theory  as well  as since.  See,  for instance,  Pigou  (1927) 
and Haberler (1937). 
2. For the United  States in the postwar,  indexation  to the aggregate price level occurs very 
infrequently  in contracts  up  to two  years  in length.  About  half of contracts over  two 
years in length  have been indexed  to the CPI (see Bils 1989b). Indexation to factors other 
than the aggregate  price level is extremely rare. Endogenous  bonus payments  and profit 
sharing have recently become  less rare (see Kruse 1989). 
3. For example,  this  is  the  assumption  in Fischer (1977), Gray (1976), and Taylor (1979). 188 *  BILS 
firms can generate  excessive  movements  (relative to flexible-wage  solu- 
tions)  in  response  to  disturbances  that  shift  labor demand.4  Further- 
more,  if the  wage  is  predetermined  in  nominal  terms,  price-level  sur- 
prises affect employment  by altering real wage  rates. 
Barro (1977) criticizes  this  view  of employment  determination  in the 
presence  of rigid wages.  In situations  where  the impact of wage  rigidity 
would  be important,  he argues the parties should  have strong incentive 
to find a way to avoid the easily identified  losses  from excessive  variabil- 
ity. Hall  (1980) suggests  that  long-term  firm worker  attachments  may 
provide  a setting  where  firms consider  workers'  preferences  as well  as 
the wage  rate in choosing  employment.  The view  that rigid-wage  bar- 
gains are a veil behind  which  firms and workers trade labor in a flexible- 
wage  manner is now  pervasive  in discussions  of business  cycles. 
1.1 THE  WAGE  PATTERN  IN CONTRACTS 
I approach the issue  of how employment  is determined  within long-term 
contracts  by  exploiting  a predictable  pattern  that occurs in real wages 
during contracts.  The pattern is a large real wage  increase at the begin- 
ning  of a new  contract,  with  real wage  growth  then  typically negative 
over the remainder of the contract. This pattern is presumably familiar to 
persons  who  have  examined  bargaining  settlements.  For a number  of 
years  the  Bureau of Labor Statistics  has  published  for major collective 
bargaining  settlements  separate  rates  of  compensation  growth  for the 
first year of contracts versus  the life of contracts. 
I illustrate  this  front-loading  of labor contracts with  data for a large 
sample of the major collective bargaining agreements  in manufacturing. 
These data were  compiled  at the Urban Institute from published  reports 
4. Hall  (1988) notes  the  similar implications  of  a market-clearing  model  where  workers 
have perfectly elastic labor supplies  to a model with rigid real wages  where firms choose 
employment,  setting  marginal revenue  product equal to the wage.  This similarity only 
pertains,  however,  to disturbances  that shift labor demand.  The rigid real-wage  setting 
has  the  additional  implication  that  disturbances  that  affect  labor  supply  have  their 
impact  on  employment  and  output  muted.  The  rigid  wage  prevents  workers  from 
signaling  through  the market their willingness  to provide additional labor at a given real 
wage.  Although  in  terms  of  a single  market  such  labor supply  disturbances  may  be 
relatively unimportant,  many of the aggregate  disturbances that are often entertained- 
changes  in  government  spending,  shifts  in  investment  schedules  or  consumption 
functions-are  usually modeled  as affecting employment  and output by creating a coun- 
termovement  in real wages. 
This suggests  that an economy  with  rigid wages  will fluctuate  more dramatically in 
response  to  supply  disturbances  (e.g.,  an improved  technology)  and  less  to demand 
disturbances  (e.g.,  an increase  in government  spending)  than a comparable  economy 
with  flexible  wages.  A  corollary is  that  supply  disturbances  may  cyclically  dominate 
even  if the  underlying  disturbances  are predominantly  disturbances  such  as shifts  in 
government  spending  or investment  policies. Wage  and  Employment  Patterns  in Long-term  Contracts  *  189 
on contracts contained  primarily in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current 
Wage Developments. They  are described  in detail in Vroman  (1984) and 
Vroman (1986). (This data set is subsequently  referred to as the Vroman 
data.)  The  data  cover  3,071  contracts  in  manufacturing,  with  starting 
dates occurring within  the years 1957 to 1983.5  The data contain informa- 
tion separately  on contract wage  changes  that occur in the first year of a 
contract and on wage changes  occurring during the balance of a contract. 
Table 1 presents  the growth of wages  in the first year of these contracts 
compared to over their balance. Wage growth is expressed  relative to the 
growth in straight-time wage  rates in manufacturing as a whole  over the 
corresponding  months; it is expressed  at an annual rate of growth. Atten- 
tion is restricted to the 2,178 contracts (of 3,071) with durations of at least 
two years.  First, consider  the bottom row of Table 1, which gives results 
for all 2,178  contracts.  Not  surprisingly,  contract wage  rates show  no 
movement  on average relative to straight-time wage rates in all of manu- 
facturing.  The contract wages  typically grew by 1.11 percent relative to 
manufacturing  in the first year. The contract data do not show  whether 
this occurs from a one-time  jump at the beginning  of contracts or from 
faster  growth  throughout  the  first year.  Evidence  from industry  data 
reported below,  however,  suggests  it occurs at the front of the contract. 
The contract wages  then  lose  this relative position  by growing  at a rate 
0.64% per year less  than total manufacturing  over the remainder of the 
contract. Thus, contract wages  in real terms grow 1.75% faster in the first 
year than over their balance. 
The top panel  of Table 1 breaks the contracts down  by duration.  For 
contracts of each category  of length,  wages  grow  considerably  faster in 
the  first year.  The  differential  is  larger, however,  for longer  contracts 
(those three-plus  years in length). 
One possible  explanation  for this sawtooth  pattern in relative wages  is 
simply that wage setters find it convenient  to set a constant wage over the 
contract, updating  it discreetly at contract points to reflect the growth of 
prices and  real wages  (as in Taylor, 1979). This view,  however,  can be 
rejected because  contracts very rarely specify  a constant  wage  over the 
contract.  Of  the  2,178  contracts  represented  in Table 1, 92% specify  a 
noncontingent  wage  increase  at some  point after the first year. Some of 
the remaining  8% experience  an indexed  wage  increase; so only about 5 
percent of the contracts exhibit no wage  increases after the first year. 
A related explanation  is that contracters find it costly to index to infla- 
tion; lack of indexation  requires discrete adjustment of wages at the front 
5. Some contracts are reported that began prior to 1957 and after 1983; but the coverage for 
these  earlier and  later periods  is much  less  representative  of the complete  bargaining 
pattern in manufacturing  (see Bils 1989b). 190 *  BILS 
Table  1  ANNUAL RATE  OF REAL  WAGE  GROWTH  (RELATIVE  TO 
STRAIGHT-TIME  MANUFACTURING  WAGES)  IN LONG  (2+ 
YEARS)  UNION CONTRACTS* 
Rate  of  Rate  First  Year 
#  Growth  Rate  in  During  Minus 
contracts  Duration  First  Year  Balance  Balance 
By  Length 
24 Mos.  669  0.14  0.80  -0.53  1.33 
(0.87)  (.124)  (.101)  (.137) 
25-35 Mos.  278  0.18  0.81  -0.21  1.02 
(.135)  (.192)  (.157)  (.212) 
36 Mos.  1108  -0.04  1.36  -0.73  2.10 
(.068)  (.096)  (.078)  (.106) 
> 36 Mos.  123  -0.56  1.28  -1.30  2.59 
(.203)  (.288)  (.235)  (.319) 
By  Indexation 
Not Indexed  1349  -0.35  0.87  -1.13  2.00 
(.060)  (.087)  (.069)  (.097) 
Indexed  829  0.61  1.51  0.17  1.34 
(.077)  (.111)  (.088)  (.123) 
For  All  2178  0.02  1.11  -0.64  1.75 
>=  24  (.048)  (.069)  (.056)  (.076) 
*Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  Contracts  are settled  in years 1957  through  1983. 
of each contract to respond  to unexpected  inflation  (or unexpected  real 
wage  growth)  occurring during  the term of the preceding  contract. The 
obvious  problem  for this  explanation  is  that it requires  contractors  to 
consistently  and sizably underpredict  nominal wage  growth on average 
for the entire 27 years being  considered.  In fact, the differential in wage 
growth  for the  first year  of  contracts  is  statistically  and  quantitatively 
positive  for each  and  every  year  of  the  1960s and  1970s.6 The  second 
panel  of  Table  1  presents  results  separately  for  contracts  indexed  to 
inflation  and  those  that  are not.  Although  the  first-year wage  growth 
differential is larger for nonindexed  contracts, it is very large and statisti- 
cally significant  for indexed  contracts as well.7 
6. Over the  1960s and  1970s,  inflation  rates did  on  average  exceed  expected  inflation  as 
given by the Livingston  Index of Inflation forecasts (Caskey 1985, page 769). The wedge 
between  actual and expected,  however,  was largely confined to the years 1969-70,  1973- 
74, and 1978-79. 
7. Note  the  striking  feature  that indexed  contracts  have  much  more rapid wage  growth 
than nonindexed-gaining  3% on nonindexed  over a three-year contract. This feature is 
discussed  in detail in Bils (1989b). I know of no compelling  explanation for why contracts 
with high-expected  wage  growth  should  be so much more inclined to be indexed. Wage  and  Employment  Patterns  in Long-term  Contracts  *  191 
I find the most plausible  interpretation  to be that bargainers construct 
wage  paths  with  an  objective  of  concentrating  wage  increases  at the 
beginning  of contracts; this results  in sizable and predictable real wage 
variability over the contract. 
1.2 OVERVIEW 
The paper is composed  of five sections,  the first of which is this Introduc- 
tion.  Section 2 examines  patterns  in employment  during contracts. The 
obvious  question  is whether  employment  predictably  increases  over  a 
contract  as  real  wages  predictably  decline.  This  is  the  implication  of 
simply applying  the framework of firms unilaterally setting employment 
subject to the wage. 
The contract data do not contain time series for employment.  To exam- 
ine employment  behavior  I consider  two alternative data sources.  First, 
in industries  where  bargaining  occurs in distinct patterns across time,  I 
match  spikes  in bargaining  activity  to industry-level  employment  and 
turnover data. Second,  in some  cases collective bargaining occurs with a 
significant fraction of a company's  work force. I examine annual employ- 
ment series derived from company  annual reports for 40 such companies 
represented  in the Vroman contract data. 
The wage  patterns  depicted  in Table 1 show  up clearly in three-digit- 
level  industry  wage  rates as well-wage  rates increase  markedly in an 
industry immediately  after a number of workers in that industry receive 
new contracts. As a rule, industry employment  shows  no corresponding 
decrease  when  wages  are predictably  increasing  at the beginning  of a 
contract. In fact on average,  there is higher  employment  growth  at the 
beginning  of contracts.  This average  pattern,  however,  hides  consider- 
able  differences  across  industries:  some  industries  (particularly motor 
vehicles)  have  higher  employment  growth  during  the  early  part of  a 
contract, whereas  others have slower growth at the beginning.  Employ- 
ment for the 40-company  exhibits behavior consistent  with the industry 
results:  that  is,  employment  declines  over  the  course  of  contracts  as 
wage  rates decline. 
To properly  draw  conclusions  from these  predictable wage  and  em- 
ployment  patterns  requires  a  theoretical  framework  that  predicts  the 
decline  in  wage  rates  during  contracts.  Section  3 presents  a model  to 
explain  the  structure  of  long-term  labor contract,  in  particular wage- 
employment  patterns  within  contracts.  The  starting  point  is  the  pre- 
sumption  that the demand  by firms for labor is dynamic.  The notion  of 
labor as a quasi-fixed  factor was pioneered  by Clark (1923) and Oi (1962). 
In a bargaining  setting  dynamic  labor demand  provides  an important 
rationale  for long-term  bargains.  The  setting  I consider  is a monopoly 192 *  BILS 
union  setting wages  for a firm or group of firms. With labor quasi-fixed, 
labor demand  this period depends  negatively  on anticipated future wage 
rates. In setting its wage  today, a union would  like to convince firms that 
in future periods it will reduce its wage demands.  But this is not credible; 
firms know  that when  the future arrives the union  will demand  what- 
ever wage  maximizes  its objective.  By offering firms a long-term  agree- 
ment,  however,  it is possible  for the union  to successfully  precommit to 
lower  wages  for the remainder  of the agreement.  Such commitment  is 
desirable  to the union.  It will also typically be preferable for the firms. 
The  long-term  agreements  will  have  lower  wages  on  average  than  a 
series of shorter agreements. 
The model  has very sharp predictions  for the dynamics  of wages  and 
employment.  It predicts  strongly  declining  wage  rates over the life of a 
contract.  The  model's  predictions  for employment  behavior  over  con- 
tracts depend  crucially on the nature of industry bargaining. If the union 
bargains  with  a large  number  of  firms  as  a group,  then  no  firm has 
incentive  to influence  subsequent  bargains by laying off workers. There- 
fore, the decline  in wages  over contracts implies  an increase in employ- 
ment. If an industry has few firms or bargains independently,  then firms 
have  incentive  to reduce  employment  toward  the  end  of a contract to 
achieve  a lower  wage  in the  subsequent  agreement.  This suggests  that 
industries  with  few  firms  or  less  of  a bargaining  pattern  should  not 
exhibit significant increases in employment  during contracts despite pre- 
dictably declining  wage  rates. 
Section  4 tests  specific  implications  derived  from this model  of long- 
term labor contracts.  I test whether  wage  declines  during contracts are 
more pronounced  in industries  where  labor is better described as quasi- 
fixed.  (In  turn,  quasi  fixity  is  proxied  by  average  industry  wages  or 
turnover rates.)  I examine  whether  industries  where  union  settlements 
are industrywide  are  more  likely  to  display  growing  employment  in 
response  to wage  declines  over contracts. Examples are industries with a 
strong bargaining  pattern across firms or where  the contract applies  to 
many  firms as  a group.  From company  data I test  whether  dominant 
firms in such  industries  are more likely to have  declining  employment 
over  a contract.  The  model  suggests  such  firms  will  have  a  stronger 
incentive  to  reduce  employment  over  a  contract  because  they  have 
greater  influence  on  the  industrywide  future  wage  settlements.  (For 
example,  I examine  whether  employment  is more likely to decline  dur- 
ing  contracts  at  General  Motors  than  at its  smaller  competitors.)  The 
evidence  in  Section  4 is  not  supportive  of  the  explanations  for wage- 
employment  patterns derived  from dynamic labor demand. 
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sions.  I interpret  the  behavior  of employment  as inconsistent  with  the 
traditional view  of employment  determined  largely by firms in the short 
run,  even  allowing  dynamic  labor demand.  The behavior  of  employ- 
ment is reasonably  consistent  with the view  of wages  as nonallocative  in 
the short run; but this leaves  unexplained  the predictably large patterns 
in wages.  I conjecture a possible  alternative to these extremes,  in which 
bargainers are able to tie themselves  more closely  to the contract curve 
(jointly efficient bargains) at earlier dates into a contract. 
2. Patterns  in Employment  and  Labor  Turnover 
During  Contracts 
The introduction  presented  the  economically  and  statistically large im- 
pact  of  bargaining  dates  on  wage  behavior.  This  section  attempts  to 
display the corresponding  within  contract pattern in employment. 
The contract data do not contain time series for employment.  They do 
contain  the number  of workers  represented  at the date of the contract. 
These  numbers  are best  interpreted  as benchmarks  for the  size  of the 
bargain negotiated.  Union  members  who  are currently unemployed  are 
often  included  in these  figures.  Furthermore,  studying  within-contract 
employment  patterns by definition  requires more frequent observations 
than  the  bargaining  dates.  I consider  two  alternative  data sources  for 
employment  data. First, I examine  industry  data at the three-digit level 
for a group  of  industries  for whom  I can  date  the  periods  with  new 
contracts for a significant  fraction of the industry's  workers.  I also relate 
the  pattern  in  employment  to  patterns  in industrywide  quits,  layoffs, 
and new  hires.  Second,  I examine  annual-report  employment  numbers 
for a set  of companies  who  have  a significant  fraction of their workers 
represented  by collective  agreements  in the Vroman data. 
2.1 CONTRACT  EFFECTS  ON INDUSTRY  EMPLOYMENT 
In this  section  I relate  wage  and  employment  behavior  from industry 
data to contracting  dates by exploiting  concentrations  of contracting ac- 
tivity in individual  industries.  I will implicitly treat contract dates as an 
instrument  for examining  the relation of wages  and employment.  This 
ignores  the possibility  that contract dates  are endogenous  with  the im- 
portant exception  of seasonal  patterns.  I believe  this is a valid exercise. 
Almost  all the contracts have  an explicit end  date and a very large frac- 
tion  end  at or near  the  scheduled  date.  Only  7% of the  contracts end 
prematurely  (Bils,  1989b).  Below  I isolate  these  7% to  test  that  their 
endogenous  endings  do not significantly  affect the estimates. 
I match contracting dates to industry employment  data as follows.  The 194 *  BILS 
Vroman  contract  data  represent  252 bargaining  situations  and  involve 
workers in 85 different three-digit manufacturing industries.8 For each of 
these  85 industries  I created a time series  for years  1958 to 1984 for the 
number  of workers  represented  by agreements  in the Vroman contract 
data.  This  equals  the  number  of  contracts in effect  at a point  in time, 
weighted  by the number  of workers  represented.  (I choose  1958 as the 
beginning  year because  industry  employment  data begin  in 1958 for a 
majority of industries.)  I further broke this time series into four compo- 
nent time series: the number of workers in the first quarter of a contract, 
the number of workers in the remainder of the first year of a contract, the 
number of workers  in the second  year of a contract, and the number of 
persons  in  the  third  or  later  year  of  a  contract.  The  time  series  are 
quarterly, calculated  for each of the months  of January, April, July, and 
October for each year from 1958 to 1984. One of these  months  is in the 
first quarter of a new  contract if settlement  of a contract occurred in one 
of the  preceding  three  months.  (For instance,  January 1980 is the  first 
observation  of a new  contract if settlement  occurred in either October, 
November,  or December  of 1979.) 
A key  factor in matching  contracting  to industry  employment  is the 
fraction of  workers  involved  in  contracts  in  the  data.  Define  industry 
coverage by the following  average: 
1  T  Contract Employmentt  s = *-  O  (1)  T =1 Industry Employmentt 
S implicitly has an industry-specific  subscript.  t runs from 1958 to 1984.9 
Industry  employment  is  production-worker  employment  from the  Bu- 
reau of Labor Statistics Establishment  Survey. S is quite small for a num- 
ber of  the  85 industries  represented  in the  contract data  set.  I restrict 
subsequent  matching  solely  to those industries  for whom  coverage (S) is 
greater than  10%. This reduces  the  number  of industries  to 40.  These 
industries  are listed in Table 2 together with their coverage rate (S). I also 
8. A bargaining  situation  is a continued negotiating  match. In a majority  of cases this is a 
single union and single firm. In about one-fourth of cases it is a single union and 
multiple firms who receive a common agreement. In a very small subset of cases it 
involves multiple unions bargaining  together. One of the 85 industries I consider is 
actually  the two-digit industry number 36, electrical  products. The large companies  in 
this case (General  Electrical,  Westinghouse)  are so diversified  that it is impossible  to fit 
them into a three-digit  industry.  The two three-digit  industries,  SIC  261  and SIC  262, are 
combined  in the BLS  data so I combine  their contracting  dates. 
9. For  a few industries  employment  is only available  for 1972  and after. Wage  and  Employment  Patterns  in Long-term  Contracts  ?  195 
Table  2  EMPLOYMENT  COVERED  IN CONTRACT  DATA  AS FRACTION 
OF INDUSTRY  PRODUCTION  WORKERS 
Industry  Data  Industry  Data 
SIC  #  Coverage  SIC  #  Coverage 
202  .140  321*  .754 
203*  .349  322*  .331 
206  .166  324*  .331 
211*  .416  326  .142 
221  .134  331  .225 
226  .198  333*  1.235 
231*  1.220  341*  .488 
232*  .341  351  .194 
233*  .454  352*  .989 
234  .130  360  .101 
236  .152  362  .225 
242  .145  363  .207 
261/262  .155  365*  .388 
263*  .318  366  .162 
281  .231  369  .106 
282  .158  371*  1.074 
291  .170  372*  .379 
301*  .859  373*  .345 
314  .132  374*  .416 
317*  .381  387  .171 
*Industries  with coverage  greater  than 25%,  included  in more  restrictive  sample. 
present  results  below  for a more restrictive sample  of 19 industries  for 
whom  the  coverage  rate  is  greater  than  25%. In  three  of  the  highly 
unionized  industries,  men's apparel (SIC 231), aluminum and other met- 
als (SIC 333), and motor vehicles  (SIC 371), the coverage is greater than 
one-presumably  because  the contract number of workers reflects some 
unemployed  and some  nonproduction  workers.  I set S equal to one  for 
these  three industries. 
For the remaining  40 industries  I examine the impact of contract dates 
by regressing  rates of growth in industry wages  and employment  on the 
fraction of workers  at each point in a contract. The estimated  equations 
are: 
Wage  = C  t + a  S(lst  Quart Emp)  (lst  Year Emp)  Growth  Const  -+ a1 S  + a2 S  Growth  Contract Emp  Contract Emp 
+ a (3rd+  Year Emp)  (2A) 
Contract Emp 
(2A) 
Contract Emp 196 *  BILS 
Emp  Const  +  b  S (st  Quart Emp)  (lst  Year Emp) 
= Const  + bS  + b  2S  Growth  Contract Emp  Contract Emp 
(3rd+  Year Emp)  (2B)  + b3  S  (2B) 
Contract Emp 
Wages and employment  data are, respectively,  average hourly earnings 
and production  worker employment  from the BLS Establishment Survey. 
Wages are measured  relative to straight-time wages for all manufacturing 
for the  same  months.  Similarly, employment  is relative to production- 
worker employment  for all manufacturing.  First-year employment  means 
excluding workers in the first quarter of contracts. Workers in the second 
year of contracts are the reference group. a's and b's are parameters. Note 
that observations  are weighted  by the coverage  rate. This assumes  that 
having all contracts expire in an industry where only 10% of the industry 
is  covered  by  major agreements  will  have  one-tenth  the  impact  of  all 
contracts expiring in an industry that is entirely covered by agreements.10 
If agreements  in an industry  were  perfectly uniformly  distributed  over 
time the right-hand-side  variables would  all be constants.  This is not the 
case.  A number  of industries  have distinct bargaining patterns; in some 
cases a large majority of workers are all represented  by new agreements 
within  the span of a few weeks  (see Bils, 1989a). 
The 40 industries  provide 4,112 observations  on rates of growth.  (This 
is 1958:2 to 1984:4 for all industries,  except SICs 203, 281, and 352 are for 
1972:2 to  1984:4 because  BLS data are only  available from  1972.) It is 
necessary  to eliminate  some observations  due to strikes. Strikes have the 
impact of reducing  employment  at the end of one contract as workers go 
on  strike,  then  increasing  employment  at the  beginning  of the  subse- 
quent contract as workers have returned. I eliminated all quarterly obser- 
vations  that occur during  a strike,  as well  as the  subsequent  quarterly 
observation.  I view  the entire industry  observation  as strike polluted  no 
matter how  few  workers  are on  strike.  Data on  strike occurrences  are 
contained  in  the  Vroman  contract  data.  Fortunately  many  strikes  are 
sufficiently  short  that  they  do  not  overlap  with  the  measurements  of 
employment  at quarterly intervals.11 One hundred  and sixteen observa- 
tions were lost to strikes, leaving  a total of 3,996 quarterly observations. 
10. This assumption will fail, for instance, where a number of firms in an industry set 
wages outside of major  agreements  but in a manner  to mimic the major  agreements. 
11. The Establishment  Survey measures monthly employment  by the number  of employ- 
ees who were employed during the pay period covering  the fifteenth  of that month. I 
designated any month for which a strike was in progress on the fifteenth a strike- 
polluted month. Thus, I erred in the direction  of eliminating  periods not affected  by 
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The regressions  for equations  (2A) and  (2B) additionally  incorporate 
industry-specific  constants  and  seasonal  dummies.  I  also  consider 
industry-specific  seasonal  dummies. 
Results for wage  growth  appear in Table 3. The first two rows use all 
40 industries  for which  contract coverage is greater than 10%. I will focus 
primarily  on  the  second  row,  which  allows  for  industry-specific  sea- 
sonals.  Wage  growth  is  much  faster in  the  first quarter of  a contract. 
Wages grow 1.38% faster in the first quarter relative to the second year of 
contracts.  Wage growth  during  the remainder  of the first contract year 
and past the second  year of the contract is not significantly different than 
growth  in  the  second  year.  These  estimates  are extremely  consistent 
with the finding from the contract-data wages  in Table 1 that wages  grow 
1.75% faster in the first contract year. The estimates  in row 2 of Table 3 
imply  1.83% faster wage  growth  in  the  first contract year than  in  the 
second.  (This equals the first-quarter effect,  1.38%, added to three quar- 
ters of 0.15% faster wage growth in quarters two through four of the first 
contract year.) The estimates here, however,  provide the additional infor- 
mation  that most  of the  first-year effect occurs at the very front of the 
contract. 
I also estimated  industry-specific  effects of contract dates.  The F-tests 
in  Table 3  are  against  a  null  hypothesis  that  the  contract  date  effect 
equals  zero  for  all industries.  The  F-tests  for the  first and  third year 
Table  3  QUARTERLY  RATES  OF WAGE  GROWTH  BY  POINT  IN 
CONTRACT,  INDUSTRY  DATA* 
Common Common  Common  F-test  F-test  F-test 
Ist-Quart 1st-Year 3rd-Year  for  for  for 
Effect  Effect  Effect  1st Quart 1st Year 3rd  Year 
Sample  & Specification 
40 Industries-  2.17  -0.10  -0.25  4.75t  0.80  0.64 
Common  Seasonals  (7.76)  (-0.55)  (-1.41) 
40 Industries-  1.38  0.15  -0.21  3.34t  0.90  0.70 
Industry-Specific  (5.51)  (1.00)  (-1.38) 
Seasonals 
19 Industries-  1.73  -0.02  -0.31  4.24t  0.61  0.78 
Common Seasonals  (5.82)  (-0.13)  (-1.72) 
19 Industries-  1.19  0.14  -0.26  2.47t  1.01  0.89 
Industry-Specific  (4.27)  (0.88)  (-1.63) 
Seasonals 
*The  40-industry  sample has 3,936 observations;  the 19-industry  sample has 1,830. T-statistics  are in 
parentheses. 
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effects  accept  the null hypothesis  that for all industries  wage  growth  is 
constant  after the first quarter of a contract. The pattern of first-quarter 
effects across industries  is discussed  shortly below. 
Constraining  industries  to have  common  seasonal  effects  (see row  1) 
raises  the  estimated  first-quarter effect  to 2.17%. But the  data strongly 
reject the restriction of common  seasonal  effects. 
The second  panel of Table 3 reduces  the sample to the 19 industries  for 
which  the contract data cover 25% of industry  employment.  The results 
are very  similar to that obtained  with  the broader 40 industry  sample. 
Results  for employment  growth  appear in Table 4. I again focus most 
discussion  on the results  when  industry-specific  seasonals  are allowed. 
For the sample  as a whole,  employment  growth  is definitely  not slower 
at the beginning  of contracts  when  wages  are sharply  increasing.  Em- 
ployment  actually  grows  3% faster in the  first year than in the  second 
(from a quarterly  rate differential  of approximately  three-quarters  of a 
percent). The estimate for the first quarter by itself is statistically insignifi- 
cant; the estimate  for the remaining  three quarters is marginally signifi- 
cant.  Comparing  simply  the  first year (including  the first quarter) with 
all later contract years yields  a 0.84% higher quarterly growth rate in the 
first year (3.36% per year), with a t-statistic of 2.39. 
The F-tests in Table 4 show  considerable  cross-industry  differences  in 
the  first-quarter behavior  of  employment.  Although  a  common  first- 
Table  4  QUARTERLY  RATES  OF EMPLOYMENT  GROWTH  BY  POINT  IN 
CONTRACT,  INDUSTRY  DATA* 
Common Common Common  F-test  F-test  F-test 
Ist-Quart Ist-Year 3rd-Year  for  for  for 
Effect  Effect  Effect  1st Quart 1st Year 3rd  Year 
Sample  & Specification 
40 Industries-  1.21  0.61  -0.27  2.91t  1.11  0.64 
Common Seasonals  (1.19)  (0.97)  (-0.43) 
40 Industries-  0.77  0.74  -0.23  2.29t  0.53  1.09 
Industry-Specific  (0.77)  (1.71)  (-0.53) 
Seasonals 
19 Industries-  1.71  0.39  -0.43  2.65t  1.21  0.86 
Common Seasonals  (1.45)  (0.59)  (-0.59) 
19 Industries-  1.12  0.59  -0.38  2.62t  0.36  1.40 
Industry-Specific  (1.27)  (1.12)  (--0.73) 
Seasonals 
*The 40-industry  sample  has  3,936  observations;  the  19-industry  sample  has  1,830.  T-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
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Table  5  1ST  QUARTER  WAGE  AND EMPLOYMENT  EFFECTS  BY 
INDUSTRY* 
Industry  Wage  Effect  Employment  Effect 
203  4.70  (1.70)  -0.22  (-0.03) 
211  3.51  (2.06)  -8.15  (-1.52) 
231  1.79  (2.98)  -0.89  (-0.47) 
232  0.71  (0.41)  0.08  (0.01) 
233  0.49  (0.32)  -5.22  (-1.09) 
263  0.23  (0.12)  -3.94  (-0.66) 
301  -0.24  (-0.36)  0.14  (0.07) 
317  0.83  (0.53)  -6.82  (-1.38) 
321  0.35  (0.35)  -1.84  (-0.58) 
322  4.49  (1.81)  3.56  (0.46) 
324  3.45  (1.73)  -2.26  (-0.36) 
333  0.33  (0.35)  2.46  (0.84) 
341  1.16  (0.98)  -4.64  (-1.25) 
352  2.05  (1.01)  -1.11  (-0.17) 
365  -1.51  (-0.76)  8.94  (1.44) 
371  2.40  (3.07)  14.71  (5.97) 
372  3.02  (1.26)  4.94  (0.66) 
373  10.71  (3.07)  0.29  (0.03) 
374  -1.99  (-0.86)  11.48  (1.57) 
T-statistics  are in parentheses. 
quarter  effect  on  employment  growth  is  statistically  insignificant, 
industry-specific  effects are very significant. 
In row 1, industries  are constrained  to have common  seasonal  effects. 
This increases  the first-quarter effect relative to that for the remainder of 
the first year. The data, however,  strongly  reject the restriction of com- 
mon seasonals. 
The second  panel of Table 3 considers  the smaller sample of 19 indus- 
tries with  25% coverage.  The results are consistent  with the faster first- 
year growth  found  for the 40-industry  sample; but employment  growth 
is higher  in  the  first quarter of a contract than in the  remaining  three 
quarters of the first year. As for the 40-industry  sample,  an F-test clearly 
rejects  a  common  zero  first-quarter  employment  effect  in  favor  of 
industry-specific  nonzero  effects. 
Table 5 presents  the  industry-specific  estimates  of the impact of first 
contract periods  on  both  wage  rates  and  employment.  The  estimates 
correspond to the reported regressions  in row 4 of Tables 4 and 5; they are 
for the  narrower  19-industry  sample  and  reflect industry-specific  sea- 
sonals.  Seven  of  the  industries  have  significantly  positive  first-quarter 
effects on wages.  Three industries  have negative  estimates; but none are 200 *  BILS 
significantly  different  from  zero.  With  respect  to  employment,  motor 
vehicles  (SIC 371) is a significant  outlier. Two other industries  (SICs 365 
and 374) exhibited  quantitatively  large increases  in employment  at the 
beginning  of contracts; but these  effects are only marginally statistically 
significant.  A number  of industries  have negative  estimated  effects,  but 
none  of  which  are very  statistically  significant.  There is  little  relation 
between  the  cross-industry  patterns  in wage  and  employment  effects. 
The motor vehicle industry has predictably experienced  rapid employ- 
ment growth  at the beginning  of new  contracts. In fact, dropping motor 
vehicles  from the cross-industry  sample  removes  the significantly  posi- 
tive first-year effect on employment  growth.  Including motor vehicles  in 
the  40-industry  sample,  I  reported  above  a  0.84%  higher  quarterly 
growth  rate in employment  in the first contract year than in later years, 
with  a t-statistic of 2.39.  Removing  motor vehicles,  this five-year effect 
remains  positive,  but becomes  only  .04% with  a t-statistic of 0.12.  Sec- 
tion 4 examines  behavior  separately  for the four largest auto producers 
as well as two large motor vehicle  parts companies. 
Unfortunately,  many  of the industries  did not have sufficient concen- 
trations of bargaining activity to provide confident  estimates of industry- 
specific effects.  The model  in Section 3 yields  predictions  for stratifying 
the industries.  These are empirically tested in Section 4. 
I am treating stage of contract as an instrument  to examine the relation 
of  employment  to  predictable  wage  movements.  If dates  of  contract 
endings  respond  to an important  degree  to market conditions  this may 
be  inappropriate.  Most  contracts  in  the  data set  did  end  according  to 
schedule.  About  7% were  reopened  prior to  the  scheduled  end.  For 
about one-fourth  of the  sample  there occurred a gap between  one  con- 
tract's scheduled  end  and  signed  agreement  on a subsequent  contract. 
Most of these  delays,  however,  were brief periods  of a month  or two or 
less.  About one-third  of these  gaps resulted from strikes. 
Table 6 allows  different  behavior  for wages  and  employment  in the 
first year  of  contracts  that follow  unscheduled  reopening.  Eliminating 
unscheduled  reopenings  yields  results  very  close  to those  reported  in 
Tables 3 through  5. The faster wage  growth  at the front of contracts is 
even  more pronounced  after a contract is reopened  early. So eliminating 
these  periods  reduces  the  front  loading  in  the  remaining  contracts 
slightly  (the first quarter effect goes  from 1.38% to 1.29%). Eliminating 
the periods following  reopenings  does not affect the finding of about 3% 
faster employment  growth  in the first year of contracts. This faster first- 
year growth  is slightly  more skewed  to the first quarter of the first year 
in Table 6 than in Table 4; but that change is slight and statistically quite 
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Table  6  WAGE  AND EMPLOYMENT  GROWTH  BY  POINT  IN CONTRACT, 
INDUSTRY  DATA, SEPARATING  EFFECTS  OF EARLY  REOPENINGS* 
Wage  Growth  Employment  Growth 
Common lst-Quarter  Effect  1.29  0.85 
(4.84)  (1.10) 
Common lst-Year Effect  0.11  0.69 
(0.74)  (1.54) 
Common  3rd-Year  Effect  -0.21  -0.23 
(-1.39)  (-0.53) 
Common lst-Quarter  After  1.94  0.19 
Reopener  Effect  (2.93)  (0.10) 
Common lst-Year  After  0.47  1.17 
Reopener  Effect  (1.22)  (1.04) 
F-test  for 1st Quarter  3.55t  2.52t 
F-test  for 1st Year  0.81  0.59 
F-test  for 3rd Year  0.66  1.14 
N  3936  3936 
*Results  are for the 40-industry  sample. Regressions  include  industry-specific  seasonals.  T-statistics  are in 
parentheses. 
tSignificant  at .0001  level. 
2.2 CONTRACTS  EFFECTS  ON INDUSTRY  TURNOVER 
The finding  that,  on  average,  employment  growth  is at least as strong 
when  wages  are rapidly growing  at the beginning  of a contract raises the 
question  about  whether  labor supply  is  directly  constraining  employ- 
ment.  More  exactly, the  decline  in  real wages  during  a contract could 
cause quits to grow over the course of a contract. The low real wage late in 
contracts could inhibit firms' ability to replace these quits with new hires. 
I additionally  examined  the  pattern  in quits,  layoffs,  and  new  hires 
during the life of contracts.  The BLS collected  monthly  data from estab- 
lishments  on the number of quits, layoffs,  and new  hires for most three- 
digit  manufacturing  industries  for the  years  1958 to  1981. The rate of 
growth in employment  over a three-month  period approximately equals 
employee  additions  per hundred  workers  minus  separations  per hun- 
dred workers  summed  over  the  three-monthly  periods.  In turn,  addi- 
tions  are classified  by  the  BLS as  new  hires  or recalled  workers;  and 
separation are classified  as quits or layoffs.  The BLS series for number of 
recalls did not begin until 1976 and is not available for a number of three- 
digit  industries;  therefore  I restrict attention  to  the  behavior  of  quits, 
layoffs,  and new  hires. 
Turnover data are available for 38 of the 40-industry  sample  listed  in 202 *  BILS 
Table 2.  (The two  industries  that are eliminated  are SICs 317 and 321. 
Data begin  in  1960 for SIC 331.  For ten  industries,  SICs 202, 203, 206, 
233, 236, 281, 326, 333, 341, and 387, data begin  in 1972.) The employ- 
ment  estimates  above  use  a panel  of 3,996 observations.  Availability of 
the  turnover  data  reduces  the  number  of  observations  to  2,849.  I 
reestimated  the first-year employment  effect for this more limited  sam- 
ple. The result is a 1.14% faster quarterly rate of growth in the first year 
of contracts,  with  a t-statistic of 2.68.  This is somewhat  above  the esti- 
mate of 0.84% for the broader sample. 
I estimate  the first-contract-year effect on quits, layoffs, and new hires 
in the same fashion  as for employment  above. That is, industry spikes in 
bargaining  activity  are  weighted  by  the  fraction  of  industry  workers 
represented  by contracts. The regression includes industry-specific  dum- 
mies and seasonals.  Each industry  turnover rate is measured  relative to 
that period's  value for manufacturing  as a whole. 
The faster employment  growth  in the first year of contracts does  not 
come  from  a decrease  in  quits; in  fact quits  per hundred  workers  are 
higher  in  the  first contract year by  0.53.  (The corresponding  t-statistic 
equals 1.82.) This increase in quits in the first contract year, however,  is 
more than offset  by reduced  layoffs  and increased  new  hires. The first- 
year effect  on  layoffs  per  hundred  workers  equals  -0.52  (t-statistic of 
-1.98);  the first-year effect on new  hires equals 0.55 (t-statistic of 2.94). 
The  possibility  that  employment  fails  to  decline  with  first-year wage 
increases  because  increased  layoffs  are matched  by  reduced  quits  can 
thus be ruled out. 
2.3 EMPLOYMENT  PATTERNS  FROM  COMPANY  RECORDS 
This  section  matches  contracting  dates  for  a  set  of  companies  with 
agreements  in  the  Vroman  contract  data  to  those  companies'  annual 
employment  figures  derived  from  annual  reports.  The  annual-report 
employment  numbers  were  taken from annual issues  of Moody's  Indus- 
trial Manual. 
At a majority of companies,  and all diversified  corporations,  employ- 
ment  covered  by  a particular collective  bargaining  situation  is  only  a 
small fraction of total employment.  I restrict attention  to companies  for 
whom  workers represented  in the contract data constitute at least 25% of 
their total work  force.  This is based  on comparing  their 1975 company 
employment  to employment  covered by their collective bargaining agree- 
ments  in  effect  in  1975.  I also  restricted  attention  to  companies  who 
signed  contracts  averaging  at least  two  years  in  length.  With  shorter 
contracts it is  difficult  to isolate  within  contract employment  behavior 
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These  restrictions,  as well  as availability in Moody's,  led to the selec- 
tion of the 40 companies  listed in Table 7 (along with the union or unions 
with whom  they bargain). The companies  are disproportionately  concen- 
trated  in  the  motor  vehicle  and  parts,  farm  machinery,  aircraft, and 
cement  industries.  Table 7 also  give  each  company's  average  employ- 
ment over the sample  period. 
I examine  employment  behavior  at these  companies  as a function  of 
point  of  time  in  their major labor contract or contracts.  I examine  the 
years  1958 to 1984. Some  observations  are lost due  to missing  employ- 
ment figures in Moody's.  I eliminate  other observations  due to mergers 
that  occur  in  a  particular  year.  If  a  merger  caused  the  company  to 
become  part  of  a  considerable  larger company,  I eliminate  all  subse- 
quent observations. 
For each annual observation  on employment  I constructed the number 
of months  elapsed  since a contract settlement.  The most  typical case in 
the  data  is  a  company  that  bargains  with  a  single  major union  and 
reports employment  as of particular date of the year. (December 31 is the 
most  frequent  date.)  In these  cases  the calculation is a simple  subtrac- 
tion.  For about one-third  of the observations  the employment  reported 
in Moody's  is an average annual. For these cases distance into contract is 
measured  by the average distance over all points  during the year. 
As with  the industry  numbers,  I weighted  the importance of contract 
by the fraction of company  employment  represented  in the bargaining 
data. The weights  are calculated similarly to the industry weights,  S, in 
equation  (1), with  the word  "company" replacing the word  "industry." 
That is,  they  equal  the  average  number  of workers  represented  in the 
collective agreement  over the sample period divided by the average level 
of company  employment.  These weights,  Sc, are given in Table 7.12  Nine 
of the companies  bargain with  two  separate unions  in the Vroman con- 
tract data; one  company  (Whirlpool)  bargains  with  three.  I combined 
multiple  contract dates  for a single  company  by weighting  the duration 
into  each  contract by  the  fraction of  company  employment  that is  on 
average represented  by that particular union. 
Regressing  employment  growth  on  the  number  of months  into  the 
current  contracts  as  well  as  company-specific  constants  and  calendar 
year dummies  yields  the following: 
Emp  - -157 
GrowthEmp  (-1.63)  S, (Months In)  N = 899.  (3)  Growth  (-1.63)  c  /  v 
12. Although  I selected  companies  for whom  contract employment  equaled at least 25% of 
company  employment  as of 1975, for the entire sample period a couple of cases average 
less than 25%. 204 *  BILS 
Table 7  COMPANY RESULTS 
Contract 
Average  Coverage 
Employer  Union  Employment  Sc 
Armour & Co. 
Kroehler  Mfg. Co. 
Hudson Pulp & Pa- 
per 
Int'l Paper Co. 
New York Times 
Ideal Basic Cement 
Penn-Dixie Cement 
Marquette Cement 








Reynolds Metal Co. 
Mirro  Corp. 
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Flint Glass Workers 
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Table 7  COMPANY RESULTS (CONTINUED) 
Contract  Employment 
Average  Coverage  Regress 
Employer  Union  Employment  Sc  Coef.* 
Int'l Harvester  Autoworkers  63,840  .59  .373 
(1.06) 
Deere & Co.  Autoworkers  44,570  .49  .438 
(1.04) 
Westinghouse Elec.  Electrical  Workers  138,720  .27  -.106 
(-0.11) 
Whirlpool Corp.  Allied Indust Wkrs;  20,710  .41  .859 
Electrical  Workers;  (1.10) 
Machinists 
The Maytag Co.  Autoworkers  3,940  .59  .339 
(0.78) 
Ford Motor Co.  Autoworkers  204,800  .75  -.160 
(-0.41) 
General Motors  Autoworkers; Electri-  705,690  .56  -.456 
Corp.  cal Workers  (-0.91) 
Chrysler Corp.  Autoworkers  129,130  .66  -.928 
(-2.57) 
American Motors  Autoworkers  26,360  .51  -.261 
(-0.66) 
Dana Corp.  Autoworkers  22,530  .33  -.439 
(-0.58) 
Budd Co.  Autoworkers  17,130  .61  -1.157 
(-2.45) 
Champion Spark  Autoworkers  10,460  .35  -.414 
Plug  (-0.58) 
Libbey-Owens Ford  Rubber  Workers  15,360  .50  1.444 
(2.64) 
Boeing Co.  Machinists  91,470  .36  -.610 
(-0.84) 
Lockheed  Machinistst  71,720  .34  -1.107 
(-1.37) 
McDonnell Douglas  Machinists  65,700  .44  -.543 
Autoworkers  (-0.87) 
Newport News Ship-  Steelworkers  18,430  .91  1.286 
building  (2.69) 
Gen'l Am. Trans-  Steelworkers  9,490  .33  -.707 
port.  (-0.87) 
Pullman Inc.  Steelworkers  21,870  .22  -.621 
(-0.61) 
*Coefficient  gives estimated impact of months since most recent contract  on annual rate  of employment growth. 
tThere  are two sets of contracts  between divisions of International  Paper  and the Paperworkers,  and two sets of 
contracts  between divisions of Lockheed and the Machinists. 206  *  BILS 
Months  In equals  number  of months since the the most recent  agreement. 
S, is as given in Table 7. (For companies matched with more than one 
union, the right-hand-side  variable  is the sum of Sj(Months  In),  across  the 
unions, where i indexes a particular  union.) The results  are  comparable  to 
the industry findings. Employment grows faster in the early portion of 
contracts.  This effect is economically  large, but not quite statistically  sig- 
nificant. The coefficient  implies employment growth slows by 1.88%  for 
each additional  year into the contract. 
I also consider separate  coefficients  by company.  These are reported  in 
Table  7. An F-test  against the null of all zero effects across  companies  has 
a value of 1.41, which is significant right at the 5%  level. Employment 
growth is particularly  concentrated at the beginning of contracts for 
companies in the motor vehicle and cement industries. I hold off further 
discussion of the cross-company  effects until Section  4. 
As an alternative  to the regression  reported  in equation  (3), I regressed 
employment growth on dummy variables  for whether the employment 
observation  is in the first year, second year, or later  in a contract. 
Emp  1.47  -  2.85 
Growth 
= 
(072)  (lst Year)  (1.9)  S(3rd+ Years)  N = 899.  (4) 
The dummies are weighted by the coverage rates Sc;  results are given 
relative to employment growth in the second year of contracts. (The 
regression, as in equation (3), includes company-specific  constants and 
year-specific  dummies.) The results parallel  those for equation (3). Em- 
ployment growth is 1.5%  faster in the first year than second, and 2.9% 
faster in the second year than later years. These differentials,  though 
large, are not statistically  significant. 
The company annual reports represented  in Moody's typically  do not 
provide wage rates, so there are no comparable  regressions for wage 
growth for the company data. I did, however, repeat the regressions 
reported  in Table  1, restricting  the sample to the 50 bargaining  matches 
represented by the 40 companies in Table  7. For this subsample, which 
includes 432 contracts, average wage growth equaled 1.29%  in the first 
year of contracts compared to -0.28% in later years. The differential, 
1.57%,  has a standard  error  of 0.180. This differential  is only slightly less 
than the differential  estimated for the full sample in Table  1. 
I conclude that the company results support the industry findings: as 
wages predictably  decline during contracts,  employment remains  stable 
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3. Quasi-fixed  Labor  and  the  Structure  of Labor  Contracts 
A number  of dynamic  features  of labor markets have been  successfully 
predicted  by the model  of labor as a quasi-fixed  factor pioneered  by Oi 
(1962).13  Here I derive the implications  of dynamic labor demand  due to 
costs  of  adjusting  employment  for the  structure  of union  contracts.  I 
focus particularly on the patterns that are predicted  for wages  and em- 
ployment  within  contracts. 
I consider a monopoly  union setting wages for a firm or group of firms. 
The optimal  one- and two-period  union  contracts are derived  and com- 
pared. Dynamic  labor demand  provides  an important rationale for long- 
term (two-period)  bargains. With labor quasi-fixed, firms' labor demands 
depend  negatively  on anticipated  future wage  rates. By offering firms a 
long-term  agreement,  the  union  can  successfully  precommit  to  lower 
wages  in the later stages  of a contract. Such agreements  will have lower 
wages  on average than a series of shorter contracts. The declining wage 
rates in these long-term contracts can raise welfare for both the union and 
the firms because  they partially overcome  the time-consistency  problem 
of the union  committing  to lower future wage  rates. 
The  model  clearly  predicts  declining  wage  rates  over  the  life  of  a 
contract. The model's  predictions  for employment  behavior depend  on 
the  bargaining  setting.  If the  union  bargains  with  a large  number  of 
firms as a group  (as in apparel,  steel,  and a number of other industries) 
then no firm has incentive  to attempt to influence  subsequent  bargains 
by laying  off workers  toward  the  end  of a current agreement.  The de- 
cline in wages  over a contract, therefore,  lead directly to an increase in 
employment  corresponding  to movement  down the labor demand sched- 
ule. If a union bargains independently  with individual  firms, or a firm is 
a very large part of an industry bargaining pattern, then a firm will have 
incentive  to  reduce  employment  over  a contract in order to achieve  a 
lower  wage  in  the  subsequent  agreement.  This systematic  decrease  in 
labor demand  acts to offset  the impact of declining  wage  rates. For the 
linear-quadratic framework considered  below,  the impact of the decline 
in  wages  unambiguously  dominates.  Employment  systematically  in- 
creases  over  the  contract,  although  the  rate of increase  is quite  small. 
3.1 INDUSTRYWIDE  BARGAINING  WITH  MANY  FIRMS 
Consider first a monopoly  union bargaining jointly with a large number 
of firms. The union  sets a wage  unilaterally for the industry; firms then 
13. These include cyclical  patterns  in occupational  employment  and earnings  differentials, 
the timing of employment changes for skilled versus unskilled  workers,  and the rela- 
tive volatility  of hours versus employment  for various  workers. 208 *  BILS 
unilaterally  choose  employment.  Later I examine  bargaining with  indi- 
vidual firms, where  firms have incentive  to reduce employment  to lower 
future wage  settlements. 
The  monopoly-union  model  assumption  of  no  bargaining  over  the 
wage  rate is clearly unrealistic.  A more realistic setting might be to have 
bargaining (e.g.,  Nash) over the wage rate, with both parties knowledge- 
able that employment  will then be dictated by the firm during the life of 
the  agreement.  This  set  of  assumptions  corresponds  to the  "Right-to- 
Manage" contracting models  discussed  in Oswald  (1985). What I believe 
to be crucial in what  follows,  however,  is that the union  face a trade-off 
between  bargained  wages  and  contract employment.  This would  hold 
true in Right-to-Manage  models. 
I represent  quasi fixity by quadratic costs of adjustment  as in Sargent 
(1978) and many other applications.  Profits in period t are given by: 
Profitt =  (at -  Wt)Lt  -  (b/2)Lt2  -  (v/2)(Lt -  Lt,l)2.  (5) 
Assuming  firms maximize  discounted  long-run  profits, the demand  for 
labor in t is described by the difference equation: 
Lt=  lLt_l +  (8l/v)Et  2i(at  -  Wt). 
i=  (6) 
Et denotes  the expectations  operator conditional  on time t information. 
The forward  root  82 is  smaller  than  the  backward root 81, equaling  8,/ 
(1  +d) where  d is the rate of time discount.  The root 68 is between  zero 
and one,  and increases  with the value of v relative to b, equaling: 
2v 
(b+v+Dv)  +  [(b+v+Dv)2  - 
4Dv2]2 
(7) 
where  D equals  1/(1  +d). 
If the union  views  the opportunity  cost of labor as a constant c, union 
welfare  in time  period  t is simply  (Wt -  c)Lt. I assume  the union  maxi- 
mizes  discounted  welfare  over  an infinite  horizon  (with  the  same  dis- 
count rate as firms). 
Max  Et  Di(Wt+i -  c)Lt+i, 
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The union  maximizes  subject to the constraint that employment,  L, will 
be  chosen  by  the  firm according  to  its  labor demand  equation  (6).  In 
setting  its  wage  the  monopoly  union  takes  into  account  the  negative 
impact of its wage  on both Lt  and labor demands  in future periods. 
With one period contracts the optimal wage  markup set by the union 
has a steady-state  value of:14 
2  (a -  c) 
W=  '(9) 
(2-  8)  2 
Steady-state  employment  with one period contracts equals: 
(s81v)(a  -  c) 
L =  (10) 
(2-  8,)(1  -  82) 
In  setting  the  wage  each  period  the  union  considers  the  negative 
impact today's  wage  has  on  future  employment  demands  through  the 
backward root  81. It does  not,  however,  take into account the negative 
impact the anticipation  of today's  wage  had on earlier employment  de- 
mands because  these  effects have passed.  In a certain environment  (de- 
terministic at), the union's  optimal  strategy is to precommit to a path of 
wages  arbitrarily far into  the future.  Under perfect precommitment  the 
wage  is  lower,  but  this  is  more  than  offset  by  increased  employment 
demand.  The  optimal  (precommited)  wage  markup  and  employment 
levels  have steady  state values: 
a -  c  a-c 
W*-c=  -;  (11) 
2 
a -  c 
L*=  (12) 
(1  -  81)(1 -  82) 
This wage  is precisely  what the union  would  choose  at a point in time if 
it could pretend  that labor demand  was not dynamic  (81  and 82 equal to 
zero). 
Union  welfare  under  perfect  precommitment  compared  to  single- 
period wage  setting  equals: 
14. Wage-employment  dynamics  with  cost  of adjustment  and  with  one-period  contracts 
are considered  by Card (1986). 210 *  BILS 
(W* -  c)L*  (2  -  S,)2 
(13) 
(W -  c)L  4(1  -  (8) 
For 86 equal to .25 this ratio equals 49/48; for 86 equal to .5 it equals 9/8. 
Firm profits are also unambiguously  greater because  the wage  is strictly 
lower. 
In the  absence  of  uncertainty  these  comparisons  imply  the  optimal 
contract length  would  be infinite.  More realistically, however,  an infinite 
length  contract would  be undesirable  because  of imperfect indexing  to 
uncertain  events.  Entertaining  such  uncertainties,  an  optimal  length 
would  equate  the marginal benefit  through  precommitment  to the mar- 
ginal  loss  due  to  imperfect  indexing.  Consistent  with  a  considerable 
literature on contract length  (e.g.,  Gray, 1978), this predicts shorter con- 
tracts in  the  presence  of greater uncertainty.  It does  not,  however,  re- 
quire any assumed  direct costs  to contracting in order to generate  non- 
continuous  contracting.  This setting  yields  an additional prediction that 
contracts will be longer in industries  with considerable fixed labor costs. 
I do  not  pursue  the  issue  of  contract length  further. I focus  on  the 
structure of wage  contracts conditional  on being of one or two periods in 
length.15 I also  abstract from any  uncertainty, instead  assuming  a con- 
stant  revenue  parameter  a.  Except  for  the  issue  of  optimal  contract 
length,  I do  not  perceive  any  interesting  interactions  between  uncer- 
tainty and the analysis  here of predictable movements  during contracts 
in wages  and employment.16 
15. I do not pursue the issue of contract  length here partly  because of limitations  of space 
and focus, partly because I do not believe this model can explain the more puzzling 
features of contract length and indexation in the United States (see Bils 1989b);  in 
particular,  I refer to the facts that contracts  are longer in industries  with predictably 
more variable  employment (e.g., durable  goods industries)  and contracts  have been 
longer in periods with measurably  greater  real and nominal  uncertainty.  The model is 
also incapable  of addressing the failure  of many contracts  to index. It does, of course, 
explain the apparent  failure  of contract  wages to keep pace with predictable  inflation. 
16. Readers  have suggested that uncertainty  about the subsequent  wage settlement  might 
reduce labor  demand near the end of contracts;  that is, firms  avoid hiring  workers  for 
whom the wage may soon change unpredictably.  Note that such a result requires 
uncertainty  in the contracting  process itself, and is largely  separate  from the issue of 
whether labor  demand and labor  supply schedules are stochastic. 
Given such uncertainty,  it also clearly  requires  a dynamic labor demand function. 
Convex costs of adjusting labor,  as I am assuming, would not yield such declines in 
labor  demand at the end of contracts.  Results  from  the literature  on investment  under 
uncertainty  with convex costs of adjustment  (e.g., Hartman  1972,  Abel 1983)  are that 
increased  uncertainty  about future  output or input prices  lead to greater  investment.  It 
is possible, however, that with concave costs of adjustment  firms might delay new 
hires near the end of one contract  to resolve uncertainty  about the following contract 
wage. Beranke  (1983)  considers  capital  investment  under uncertainty  in the presence 
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To continue,  suppose  as an alternative that the union offers firms two- 
period contracts.  Bargaining occurs every other time period,  say in odd 
time periods.  If time period  t is an odd period then in time period  t the 
union sets both Wt  and Wt+,.  In setting Wt  the union takes into account its 
effect on labor demand  in period t as well as in future periods because of 
the  dynamics  of  labor demand.  In setting  W,t+ the  union  takes  these 
effects into account,  plus the impact of W,t+  on labor demand in period t. 
Thus,  long-term  contracts  allow  the  union  to  partially overcome  the 
time-consistency  problem  for period  t and  other  odd  periods  by  pre- 
commiting  to the next period's  wage. 
There is an issue  as  to whether  these  two-period  contracts are time 
consistent.  I want  to allow  for the possibility  that if both sides  wish  to 
reopen bargaining when  period t+1  arrives this is entirely possible.  As I 
will show  in a moment,  however,  firms will not want  this because  the 
wage  is lower  in second  periods  of contracts.  I do want  to rule out the 
possibility  that the union  can unilaterally renege on its wage contract by 
striking  when  period  t+1  arrives.  This restriction is  compelling  for at 
least  two  reasons.  First,  such  a walkout  would  allow  firms to perma- 
nently  replace  existing  workers  (NLRB v. Mackay  Radio & Telegraph  Co., 
1938).  Second,  the  union  could  credibly  commit  to  not  walk  out  by 
writing  a no-strike  contract.  Such a clause  would  allow  firms to obtain 
back-to-work injunctions  in the event  of a strike (Norris-LaGuardia Act, 
1932, upheld  in Boys Market,  Inc. v. Retail Clerks,  1970). Empirically strikes 
almost always  occur at the end of contracts, not over the issue of reopen- 
ing contracts. 
I present steady-state  results here, relegating derivations to the appen- 
dix.  I also  restrict attention  to  the  case  of the  discount  rate arbitrarily 
close  to zero  (d equal  to zero).  This implies  the forward and backward 
roots  in  equation  (6) are equal;  and  their  value  given  in  equation  (7) 
simplifies. 
Union  maximization  in equation  (8), subject to employment  demand 
as described in equation  (6), implies  the union  set wage markups in first 
and second  periods  of contracts, respectively,  at: 
(2  -  8 -  82) (a -  c)  W -c  = (  -'and:  (14A) 
(1-8)(2--2)  2 
2(1 -  8 -  82) (a -  c) 
W2-  c=  (14B) 
(1-8)(2-82)  2 
where 8 is the commonroot  in equation (7) with D equal to one. The ratio 
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W2-  c  2(1 -  8 -  52) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~= 
* 
~~(15)  W -c  2 -  + 63 
For instance,  for 8 equal  to  .25 this ratio equals  .78; for 8 equal to .5 it 
equals  .31. Moderate values  for 8 are capable of generating very marked 
front-loading  of contracts; therefore,  it is a promising  explanation for the 
pattern  of  compensation  displayed  in  Tables 1 and  3.  For values  of  8 
greater than about 0.62 the wage  markup is actually negative  in second 
periods.  Although  in theory the parameter 8 can range between  zero and 
one,  for production  workers empirical estimates  fall in a much narrower 
range in the neighborhood  of 0.25 (e.g.,  Shapiro, 1984, Bils, 1987) if time 
periods  are interpreted  as approximately  annual.  Relative second-  and 
first-period wage  rates for varying values  of 8 are presented  in column A 
of Table 8. 
Even in the absence  of disturbances,  employment  varies over the con- 
tract in  response  to the  pattern  in wage  rates.  L2  relative  to L1 equals: 
L2  2(1 +  8) 
-~~~~~~~~- 
v  *  ~~~~~~(16) 
Li  2+S 
For 8 equal to .25 this ratio equals 1.11; for 8 equal to .5 it equals 1.2. The 
predictable  movements  in  employment  over  the  contract are less  pro- 
nounced  than that observed  in wages  because  of firms' desire to smooth 
Table  8  WAGE  AND EMPLOYMENT  PATTERNS  PREDICTED  BY  QUASI- 
FIXED  LABOR  MODEL 
Many  Firms  One  Firm 
A  B  C  D 
W2 -  C  L2  W2  -  C  L2 
8  W -C  L1  W - C  L 
0  1  1  1  1 
.1  .936  1.048  .913  1.024 
.25  .779  1.111  .735  1.054 
.5  .308  1.2  .342  1.091 
.75  -.374  1.273  -.012  1.117 
.9  -.849  1.310  -.488  1.166 
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employment.  Values of L2 relative to L, are given  for varying values  of 8 
in column  B of Table 8. 
The union  obtains  a disproportionate  share  of its  payoff  in the  first 
period of contracts. The ratio between  periods  equals: 
(W2-  c)L2  4(1 +  8)(1 -  S -  2) 
(17) 
(W-  c)L1  (2 +  S)(2 -  -  53) 
For 8 equal to .5, union welfare in second periods is only 37% of its value 
in first periods  of contracts. Firms earn a disproportionate  share of prof- 
its in later periods  of contracts when  wage  rates are relatively low. 
It is possible  for two-period  contracts to strictly raise payouts  to both 
firms and the union  compared  to one-period  contracts because they par- 
tially solve the union's time-consistency  problem. Average wage markups 
are strictly lower  under  two  period  contracts.  (For 8 equal  to  .25,  the 
average wage markup is 5.4% lower with two-period contracts; for 8 equal 
to  .5 it is 8.9% lower.)  Thus,  it is clear that the  firm can be better off. 
Steady-state  union  welfare under two-period  contracts relative to one- 
period contracts is given  by: 
(W1 -  c)L1  +  (W2 -  c)L2  (2 -  8)2(8 -  982 -  283 +  S4) 
(18) 
2(W  -  c)L  8(2  -  2)2(1 -  8) 
For 8 equal  to  .25 steady-state  union  welfare  is 0.8% higher  with  two- 
compared  to one-period  contracts; for 8 equal to .5 it is 2.2% higher. For 
8 greater than about  .622, union  payouts  are actually lower under  two- 
period contracts. This result initially appears perverse because the union 
has the option  of setting  the wage  rate at the one-period  contract wage 
for both contract periods.  This latter strategy, however,  is not time consis- 
tent.  Anticipating  a constant-wage  path beyond  the  next two  periods, 
the  union  makes  a greater  payoff  by  setting  uneven  wages  over  this 
period and next. Similarly, anticipating a future uneven  pattern in wages 
as described  in equations  (14A) and (14B), the union  does better setting 
uneven  wages  during  this  contract. If, however,  the union  could  write 
arbitrarily long  contracts  this  problem  would  go  away.  As  discussed 
above,  values  greater than  .622 for 8 are probably empirically irrelevant 
for production  labor. 
3.2 CONTRACTING  WITH  A SIGNIFICANT  FIRM 
Wages  chosen  by  the  union  depend  positively  on  prior employment 
because  past employment  increases  firms' future employment  demands 
through  the adjustment  costs.  (See equations  (A6) and (A7) of the Ap- 214- BILS 
pendix.)  If any single  firm employs  a significant fraction of the union,  or 
if the  union  writes  separate  wage  contracts  for individual  firms,  then 
dynamic  monopsony  arises.  The firm has  incentive  to reduce  employ- 
ment  today  to receive  a lower  future wage  settlement.  This incentive  is 
potentially  very strong  (for example,  in the linear-quadratic setting with 
one-period  contracts, if the parameter v equals the parameter b implying 
a value for 8 of .38, this effect reduces  steady-state  employment  by 40%). 
The Appendix  treats the  case  of two-period  contracts written  by the 
union  for a single  firm. The impact of dynamic monopsony  is to reduce 
the forward-looking  parameter  (the parameter analogous  to 82 in equa- 
tion  (6)) in the  second  period  of contracts.  Anticipated  future employ- 
ment levels  have  a negative  impact on employment  demand  in the last 
contract period because  additional  demand  will raise the wages  paid for 
that future  employment.  (This is in  addition  to the  positive  impact  of 
future employment  on today's  demand  from the adjustment costs.) This 
implies  the labor demand  schedule  should  systematically  decline during 
a contract. 
Although  I do not obtain closed-form  solutions,  it is possible  to calcu- 
late  approximate  values  for  wages  and  employment  in  the  first  and 
second  periods  of  contracts  for given  levels  of  adjustment  costs.  Col- 
umns  C and  D  of Table 8 present  wages  and  employment  in  second- 
contract periods  relative  to first periods  for varying  values  of 8. 8 is as 
given by equation  (7) for no monopsony  impact and for D equal to one.  8 
simply  provides  a convenient  measure  of  adjustment  costs;  with  dy- 
namic monopsony  it no longer equals the coefficient of today's  employ- 
ment demand  on last period's  employment. 
Comparing Columns  A and C of Table 8, at low to intermediate values 
of  8 the  union  sets  even  steeper  wage  declines  during  contracts with 
dynamic  monopsony.  This is intuitive.  Because the firm's labor-demand 
schedule  is  predictably  decreasing  in  second  periods,  the  union  has 
further incentive  to reduce wages  in second  periods.  At higher values of 
6,  however,  the  reverse  is  true.  Wages  decline  much  less  during  con- 
tracts, despite  labor demand  declining.  The reason for this is as follows. 
With dynamic monopsony,  for given-size  costs of adjustment (and so for 
given  8),  labor demand  is  less  dynamic.  Employment  demand  is  less 
positively  related  to future employment  because  the desire not to raise 
future wages  is proportional  to future employment  levels.  Because labor 
demand  is  less  dynamic,  the  union  has  less  incentive  to  tilt its  wage 
schedule  during contracts.  At high levels  of adjustment  costs this domi- 
nates the direct effect on wage  profiles from labor demand  shifting. 
Column  D  presents  the  contracting  pattern  in  employment.  As  ex- 
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inclined  to rise over  the  contract.  The shifting  of labor demand  offsets 
the movement  responding  to wage  declines;  but this offsetting  is only 
partial.  It remains  true  that  employment  predictably  increases  during 
the contract. Thus,  this model is less than consistent  with the findings  of 
Section 2 of declining  or stable employment  during contracts. 
In the  next  section  I examine  whether,  nevertheless,  this bargaining 
story  can  help  explain  cross-industry  and  cross-country  behavior  in 
wages  and employment  during contracts. 
4. Examining  Cross-Sectional  Patterns 
Sections  1 and  2 described  how  wage  rates predictably  decline  during 
the course  of contracts.  Employment  behavior  was  shown  to be mixed 
across  industries;  but  the  movements  are more  pronounced  in  those 
industries  displaying  declining  employment  during contracts. This sec- 
tion examines  whether  patterns in wage  setting and employment  across 
the 40 three-digit  industry  sample  and 40-company  sample discussed  in 
Section  2 agree  with  predictions  of the  model  with  dynamic  labor de- 
mand in Section 3. The results are not supportive. 
4.1 RESULTS  FROM  INDUSTRY  SAMPLE 
The model in the prior section explains declining wages  during contracts 
by union  efforts  to commit  to low  future wage  rates because  labor de- 
mand  is dynamic.  Thus,  the  sawtooth  pattern in wage  rates should  be 
stronger in industries  with  greater firm-specific human capital. 
No  definitive  measure  exists  for  these  firm  specific  investments.  I 
relate the front-loading  of wage  contracts to two proxies for labor fixity. 
One is the three-digit industry's  labor turnover rate. This is measured by 
the sum of separations  and accessions  per hundred  workers per month 
averaged  over a three-year  period.  The assumption  is that greater fixed 
labor costs  reduce  turnover.  The other measure  is the natural log of the 
average hourly wage  rate in the industry for the year 1977. This assumes 
that fixed costs  rise as a fraction of labor cost at higher wage  levels  (Oi 
1962). I measure  the front-loading  of wages  by the differential between 
wage  growth  in the first year of contracts and in all subsequent  contract 
years.  (Wage growth  is expressed  at an annual rate.) These differentials 
were estimated  in a manner analogous  to the effects displayed in Table 3. 
Regressing  industry  first-year wage effects on turnover rates for the 40 
industry  sample  listed in Table 2 yields: 
1st Year  .0984 
Effec  .=  Turnover Rate  R~=.004  N = 40  (19) 
Wage Effect  (0.40) 216 *  BILS 
(The regression  includes  an intercept  as well.  The number in parenthe- 
ses is a t-statistic.)  The model  in Section 3 predicts a significantly  nega- 
tive  coefficient.  Contrary  to  that  prediction,  there  is  a  small  positive 
relation between  industry  turnover  rates and  the front-loading  of con- 
tracts. (The standard deviation  across the 40 industries  for turnover rate 
is 4.91; this has  an estimated  impact on front-loading  of less  than one- 
half of 1%.) 
A possible  explanation  for positive  coefficient  in equation  (19) is that 
workers in industries  with  high  turnover  discount  future periods  more 
heavily  because  they  may  be  gone  from the  firm. In bargaining,  such 
workers  may  prefer to front-load  compensation  in order to gain at the 
expense  of  new  hires  later in the  contract.  I discuss  this  possibility  at 
greater  length  in  the  concluding  section.  I note  here,  however,  that 
although  the estimate  in equation  (19) is positive,  it is close to zero. So it 
is not strong support  for this view  either. 
Using  the relative hourly wage  as a proxy for labor fixity yields: 
1st Year  -  1.472 
Ln(Wage)  R~ =  .003  N = 40.  (20)  Wage Effect  (-0.35) 
The estimated  relation is again  opposite  that anticipated.  This effect is 
quantitatively  small. 
As discussed  briefly above,  quasi-fixed labor also provides  a rationale 
for writing  longer  contracts.  I additionally  examined  the  relation  be- 
tween  average  industry  contract length  and  these  same  industry  turn- 
over  and  wage  measures.  Average  contract length  for the  40-industry 
sample  is calculated  from the Vroman data set.  I found  no relation be- 
tween  industry  turnover  rates and  the  length  of  industry  contracts.  I 
found  only a slight positive  relation between  industry wages  and length 
of contracts.  (A 10% higher industry  wage  is associated  with  1% longer 
industry  contracts.)  Thus,  the  evidence  on  contract  length  does  not 
strongly  support  the model  of Section 3. 
With respect to employment,  Section 3 predicts increasing employment 
during contracts,  but much smaller increases if firms are in a position  to 
influence  future  agreements.  I relate industry  employment  patterns  to 
two variables designed  to capture the ability of firms' to affect unionwide 
employment.  The first is whether  many agreements  in the industry  are 
between  a union  and multiple  firms. (Apparel is an excellent  example.) 
The second  is whether  pattern bargaining  is prevalent  in the industry. 
(Bargaining matches in the Vroman data set were classified by Vroman as 
part of pattern bargaining using a criterion established by Kochin.) I view 
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monopsony  power.  I, therefore,  expect employment  to increase particu- 
larly during contracts under these conditions.  (About 29% of contracts in 
the 40-industry  sample  are for more than one firm; about 51% are classi- 
fied as part of a broader bargaining pattern.) 
I express  the  industry-specific  pattern  in employment  by  the  differ- 
ence in the rate of employment  growth in the first year of contracts from 
later contract years (at an annual rate). Regressing this differential on the 
fraction of industry  contracts involving  more than one firm yields: 
1st Year  -5.34  lst  Year  -5  34  Mult. Firms  R2 =  .018  N  = 40.  (21) 
Employ Effect  (-0.84) 
The sign is as expected.  This states that contracts with a single firm have 
over  5% faster  employment  growth  in  the  first year of contracts.  This 
effect is economically  large,  but statistically insignificant.  I reestimated 
equation  (21) for the smaller sample  of 19 industries  listed in Table 5 for 
whom  the  contracts  cover  at least  25% of industry  employment.  This 
dramatically reduces  the  coefficient  to  -.922  (t-statistic of  -0.22).  This 
suggests  the  large,  but  statistically  insignificant  coefficient  in equation 
(21) results from difficulty in measuring  the first-year employment  effect 
in industries  with little coverage  in the contract data set. 
Regressing  employment  behavior on the fraction of industry contracts 
that are part of a bargaining  pattern yields: 
1st Year  7.38 
Pattern  R2 =  .034  N  = 40.  (22) 
Employ Effect  (1.17) 
This estimate  is of the opposite  sign  expected  and is large,  stating that 
contracts that are part of a pattern exhibit 7% faster employment  growth 
in the first contract year. But this effect is statistically insignificant.  Fur- 
thermore,  using  the  more  restrictive  19-industry  sample  reduces  the 
estimated  coefficient  to 3.93 (t-statistic of 0.70). 
4.2 RESULTS  FROM  COMPANY  SAMPLE 
I examine  two  features  of the cross-company  results presented  in Table 
7. Is employment  behavior related to the presence of an industry bargain- 
ing pattern or to a cross-industry  bargaining pattern? Does  employment 
behave  differently  at a dominant  firm in an industry  than at its smaller 
competitors? 
I have  argued  that  employment  should  particularly increase  during 
contracts in industries  displaying  pattern bargaining because  firms can 
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sented  by  the  40  companies  in  Table 7,  there  are six  industries  with 
strong  internal  bargaining  patterns.  These  are  cement,  glass  bottles, 
pulp  and  paper,  steel,  motor  vehicles,  and  aircraft. In  addition,  the 
pattern bargain in steel typically was  applied by the Steelworkers  union 
to subsequent  contracts in aluminum;  and the pattern in motor vehicles 
was  largely  applied  by  the  United  Auto  Workers in subsequent  agree- 
ments in motor vehicle  parts and in farm machinery. 
The four companies  from the cement  industry  each exhibit declining 
employment  during  contracts.  The  average  estimate  for the  four is  a 
decline  in  rate  of  employment  growth  of  8% for  each  year  into  the 
contract.17 The  two  glass  blowing  companies  display  conflicting  pat- 
terns,  as  do  the  two  pulp  and  paper  companies.  The  only  company 
producing  primarily steel is U.S. Steel. It exhibits declining  employment 
during contracts; but U.S.  Steel is so large it is unreasonable  to not view 
it  as  affecting  its  wage  settlements.  All  four  auto  companies  exhibit 
declining  employment  during contracts; the average for the four compa- 
nies is a decline in rate of employment  growth of 5.5% for each year into 
the  contract.  All  three  aircraft industries  display  falling  employment 
growth  during contracts,  the average fall for the three companies  equal- 
ing 9% per year. 
The industries  that typically followed  larger industries'  settlements- 
aluminum,  farm  machinery,  and  motor  vehicle  parts-provide  useful 
tests because  it is natural to view  their wage  settlements  as largely deter- 
mined  externally.  The  aluminum  companies  in  the  sample  show  little 
relation between  employment  growth and the dates of contracts. Among 
the  four  farm machinery  companies,  two  have  declining  employment 
and two increasing  employment  during contracts. The three motor vehi- 
cle  parts companies  represented  by the  UAW (Budd Co.,  Dana Corp., 
and Champion  Spark Plug) each display declines in employment  growth 
during  contracts; the  average  decline  is 8% for each year into the con- 
tract. The patterns  among  these  companies  is thus  at odds  either with 
the  framework  of  dynamic  monopsony,  or with  the  assumption  that 
pattern bargaining  lessens  that monopsony  power. 
Larger firms should  have greater monopsony  power; therefore I antici- 
pated  employment  declines  during  contracts  at large firms relative  to 
those  at  small  firms  subject  to  a  comparable  contract  with  the  same 
union.  Two industries  are represented  in Table 7 by companies  of mixed 
sizes  bargaining  with  a  single  union;  these  are the  paper  and  motor 
vehicle  industries. 
17. These estimated effects must by weighted by the fraction  of company employment 
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The International Paper Company is more than ten times the size of the 
only other paper company  in the sample,  Hudson  Pulp and Paper. Em- 
ployment  growth  at International  Paper on average  declined  by 4% for 
each year into a contract; employment  at Hudson  grew by 7% faster each 
additional year into contracts. Thus, this case is exactly as expected.  Nei- 
ther company's  employment  pattern, however,  is statistically significant. 
The motor vehicles  industry  provides  a better case,  as there are four 
companies  represented.  As  already  stated,  all four companies  exhibit 
declining  employment  during  contracts.  There does  not  appear  to be 
any  relation  between  size  and  steepness  of  this  decline.  The  largest 
company,  General  Motors,  exhibits  the  same  rate of  decline-5%  per 
year-as  the  group  as  a  whole.  Chrysler,  the  third largest  producer, 
exhibits the sharpest  declines,  averaging just over 10% per year into the 
contract. Part of the measured  employment  declines  during contracts at 
Chrysler can be attributed to employment  rebounds  after unscheduled 
contract reopenings  in 1980 and  1981. As pointed  out above,  the much 
smaller  vehicle  parts  companies  display  employment  declines  during 
contracts  of equal  or greater magnitude  as the  major auto  companies. 
Thus,  relative  firm  size  does  not  appear  particularly promising  for 
explaining  contract patterns in employment. 
5. Conclusions 
There  have  been  predictable  patterns  in  wage  rates and  employment 
during  labor  contracts  in  manufacturing.  Wages  have  grown  about 
1.75% faster in the  first year of contracts.  More puzzling,  employment 
has  also  on  average  grown  considerably  faster,  over  3% faster, in  the 
beginning  year  of contracts.  As  shown  above,  this pattern in employ- 
ment is less  uniform across industries  than is the pattern in wage  rates. 
One  possible  explanation  for the  front-loading  of wage  rates is that 
contracters  have  systematically  underpredicted  inflation,  and  then  re- 
peatedly  made  up for it at the front of future contracts. I dismissed  this 
explanation  partly  on  the  basis  that is  requires  too  large  a systematic 
error in  anticipating  inflation  over  too  long  of a period  (1958 to about 
1985), and because  the inflation rate was only  1 or 2% higher at the end 
of this period than at the beginning.  (I also note that front-loading occurs 
in indexed  as well  as nonindexed  contracts.) This explanation  also fails 
with respect to employment:  it predicts higher employment  later in con- 
tracts if employment  is  determined  largely  by  labor demand  within  a 
contract. 
A second  possible  explanation  for front-loading  wages  is that workers 
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that firms have  greater access  than individuals  to financial markets.  But 
this  does  not  imply  wages  should  be front-loaded.  With uneven  wage 
payments  workers  must  invest  their wages  at beginning  of contracts at 
interest rates inferior to rates available to firms. This provides  additional 
incentive  to  write  contracts  with  stable  wage  rates  (as in  the  implicit 
contracting literature). 
A more  promising  line  of reasoning  is that workers  discount  wages 
later in the  contract because  there  is a significant  probability they  will 
soon  leave  the  firm. Thus,  front-loading  is one  way  to tax subsequent 
hires in favor of the current membership.  There are problems with  this 
argument.  First, more  senior,  less  transient  workers  typically receive  a 
disproportionate  voice  in bargaining.  Second,  more  direct means  exist 
for taxing  new  hires-two-tiered  wage  structures  or simply  wage  pro- 
files  steeper  than  productivity  with  respect  to  seniority.  Third,  it pre- 
dicts, counterfactually,  rising employment  over contracts if employment 
is largely determined  by firms during contracts. 
I have  focused  on quasi-fixed  labor, giving  rise to dynamic  labor de- 
mand,  as  a potential  explanation  for the  behavior  of both  wages  and 
employment.  Dynamic  labor demand  is a promising  route because  its 
predictions  have  been  substantiated  in a number  of other contexts  (see 
footnote  13). Section  3 demonstrates  that small costs  for adjusting  em- 
ployment  can yield  sharply falling wage  rates during a labor contract. A 
union agrees to lower wage rates later in a contract as a means to expand 
employment  at the front of the contract. The decline  in wage  rates dur- 
ing contracts generally predicts corresponding  increases in employment. 
These increases  are partially mitigated,  however,  by the costs of adjust- 
ing employment.  Furthermore, if bargaining is between  the union and a 
single  firm,  that  firm has  a strong  incentive  to reduce  employment  at 
later stages  of a contract in order to lower subsequent  wage  settlements. 
This further offsets  the prediction of increasing employment  during con- 
tracts, although  only partially for the linear-quadratic setting examined. 
In Section  4 this  explanation  is put  to the  tougher  test  of explaining 
cross-industry  and cross-company  patterns in wages  and employment.  I 
conclude  that it fails. Unions  in industries  where fixed labor costs should 
be  higher  do  not  write  contracts  with  steeper  declines  in wage  rates. 
Industries  with  strong  bargaining  patterns,  and  thus  less  monopsony 
power,  do  not  exhibit  increases  in  employment  during  contracts.18 
Smaller firms  in  an  industry  with  a bargaining  pattern  do  not  exhibit 
increases in employment  during contracts. 
18. This implicity  treats  the presence of a bargaining  pattern  as exogenous. This might be 
problematic.  A union facing dynamic monopsony power as depicted in Section 3 
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It may be necessary  to drop the traditional interpretation that employ- 
ment is predominantly  chosen by the firm during the life of an agreement. 
As discussed  in the introduction,  it has become  increasingly  common  to 
view wage rates as nonallocative,  with firms and workers following  some 
more vague mechanism  to arrive at approximately jointly efficient employ- 
ment decisions.  There are two problems with this view for explaining the 
patterns  in  wages  and  employment.  For one,  it leaves  the  pattern for 
wage rates within  contracts undetermined;  thus the strong front-loading 
of wage  rates is not  explained.  Of course,  it is conceivable  to wed  this 
nonallocative  view  of wages  with  an additional  motive for front-loading 
(e.g.,  higher  discount  rates for workers  than firms).  Second,  this view 
suggests  employment  should  not be predictably related to the stage of a 
contract.  But employment  does  on  average  grow  faster at the  front of 
contracts (from Table 4, by about 3.3% in the first contract year). 
I would  entertain  a bargaining-setting  intermediate  between  employ- 
ment  chosen  by  firms  to  equate  marginal  revenue  and  the  wage  and 
employment  chosen  efficiently  to equate marginal revenue  and the op- 
portunity time of labor. It may be that employment  is based more on the 
contract curve  (efficient  locus  of choices)  at the  front of contracts,  and 
more on the  labor demand  schedule  as the contract progresses.  At the 
time of contracting,  assuming  both parties are informed on the status of 
labor demand  and supply,  there would  be no cost to specifying  the level 
of employment  as well  as wage  rates for the beginning  of the contract. 
This would  be beneficial,  as it prevents  the union  markup from distort- 
ing the firm's employment  decision  (as noted  by Leontief 1946). As the 
contract period  proceeds,  disturbances  unforeseen  at the  time  of con- 
tracting will  become  increasingly  important.  At  some  point  it may  be 
preferable to forgo  specifying  employment,  instead  relying  on the firm 
to choose  employment  subject to the wage  rate. Although  the firm will 
reduce  employment  because  of  the  union  wage  markup,  this  can be 
preferable because  it allows  employment  to respond  to the disturbances 
that occur to labor demand  during the life of the contract.19 
I suspect  this  setting  can  yield  both  declining  wages  and  declining 
employment  during  agreements.  Absent  declines  in  wages,  employ- 
ment  would  decline  during  contracts as firms obtain greater latitude  to 
set  employment.  Thus,  wages  should  decline  during  the  contract  in 
order to induce  firms to continue  to choose  employment  near the con- 
tract curve. Ideally, wages  should  decline sufficiently during the contract 
19. This strategy  would be aided by the presence of dynamic  labor  demand  as depicted  in 
Section  3. The firm  will move only part  way from  the contract  curve  to its labor  demand 
schedule because of costs of adjusting  employment  away from  the contract  curve, and 
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to avoid any predictable decline in employment.  But if it is costly to have 
very large variations in wages  during contracts some  decline in employ- 
ment might yet result. 
The  important  question  is  whether  we  observe  such  restrictions  on 
firms' choices  as  a feature  of bargaining.  For the  postwar  period  as a 
whole,  I believe  the  answer  is no.  In the eighties  there has been  some 
emphasis  on "job security" as a bargaining issue.  Some provisions  that 
have  arisen  with  regard to employment  security  do  apply  more  to the 
beginning  of  contract  periods.20 For the  most  part,  however,  it again 
becomes  necessary  to  appeal  to  unobservable  behavior  on  the  part of 
unions  and firms. 
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APPENDIX: Two-Period Contracts 
This  appendix  derives  time-consistent  two-period  wage  setting  by 
unions,  given  that firms choose  employment  period-by-period  to maxi- 
mize profits.  I treat bargaining  between  the union  and a single  firm. In 
this  case  employment  demand  is  distorted  by  the  firm's desire  to  re- 
duce future wage  rates. The case of bargaining with many independent 
firms, where  firms can essentially  take the wage  path as given,  is then 
treated as a simplifying  special case. 
Time periods  (e.g.,  years) are denoted  by the subscript t as in the text. 
It is convenient  to introduce  a second-time  subscript r, which  lasts two 
periods  of the unit measured  by t (e.g.,  r is in units of two years). Two- 
period wage  contracts are specified  by the union  in each r period.  This 
contract specifies  first- and  second-period  wage  rates; denote  these  by 
W,A  and  W7B,  respectively.  Firms choose  employment  in each of the two 
periods; denote  these  choices  by L,A and L,B. 
I  solve  for  union  wage  setting  and  firm  employment  setting  by 
method  of undetermined  coefficients.  Assume  the firm's dynamic first- 
order conditions  for employment  in odd (A) and even  (B) periods can be 
written in the form: 
L  =  glA4-1  +  g2AL4+1  +  kA(a -  W,A +  XA),  (Al) 
L  g=lB-t1  +  g2Bt+  +  kB(a -  W7B +  XB).  (A2) 224  BILS 
a is the marginal revenue  product parameter, as in the text. The g's,  k's, 
and x's are all constant  parameters.  Solutions  for the firm's problem will 
in fact fit this form. (Actually this is overly general,  as the parameter XA 
will equal zero.) 
These equations  can be manipulated  to yield LA  as a function of L/,  and 
anticipated future wage  rates: 
L  =  a3-L_  +  OX2's+  /  (A3) 
glAglB  i=O 
where: 
A =  kA(a  -  WT  +  XA)  +  glAk(a  -  WB_  +  X)  +  g2AkB(a  -  W7B +  XB). 
Similarly for even  (B) periods: 
LB  =  pB-l  + 
f 
f  (A4) 
glAglB  i=O 
where: 
?5  = kB(a  -  WT  +  XB) +  glka(a -  W  + XA)  +  g2BkA(a  -  W+1  +  XB). 
The parameters  31  and P2 are given by: 
1 






The union's  maximization  problem is as defined by equation (6) in the 
text.  (I treat  the  limiting  case  of  no  discounting.)  Manipulating  the 
union's  first-order conditions  yields  the following  expressions  for wage 
markups in odd  (A) and even  (B) periods: 
W  -  c =  P  { Lr/kA  -  glBL,S/kB  },  (A6) 
W-  c =  {[1 -  g2A(gB, +  f31g2B)][L/kB  -  g2(1  + g2B/glB)LW/kA]  -  glAL,+/kA}. 
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'A denotes  the union's  projection of these variables (LTA,  LTB,  and jLA,,)  on 
information  dated prior to t. The most recent information  is in the form 
of the firm's employment  choice LtB11 
To find  the  impact  of  the  firm's choice  of L~_,  on  future  wages  it is 
necessary  to define LA,  L', and I4+,,  solely as functions of iB_,. Combining 
equations  (Al),  (A2), (A6), and (A7), L~_  can be written as: 
T~=T~_  +  (8  a1 -  a2(8 
where  the parameters F and tL  are given by: 
aY -  (01 2-  4ala  -5). 
(i) F  a0  - 
2 
2a2 
(ii)  2KB(a  -  c +  XB) +  [kA(Z1B  +  g2B) + kBglA +  (A) 
kB(92A  +  P2g1A)(1  g2B9gAf3192B92A)](a  -  c  +  XA); 
and ao, a,,  and a2 are given by: 
W  o  4  -  292B(g1A  +  9192A) 
(i  - a  al(92A +  91BkAkB  1A  -  g1A(g2B +  glAkBIkA), 
(ii)  a, =  g1A[g1B +  (kB/kA)(g2A +  /2g1A)(1 -  g2BglA -  A92B92A)II 
(iii)  a2 =  (g2B +  g1AkBIkA)(g2A  +  g91kAIkB).  (A10) 
Projections for L, and  4+1, on 14_,  that parallel equation (A8) can also be 
calculated.  (I omit these  in the interest of space.) 
Using equation  (A8) and the comparable equations for L$  and I4A?I,  the 
impact  of  the  firm's  choice  for 14_,  on  periods  r's wage  rates  can  be 
calculated from (A6) and (A7) as: 
d WA  _g1A  +  g2AF_  g2Ag21BF,  (All) 
dLB  2kA  kB 
d WB  F(92A  +  32g1A)(g1A+g2A  Fg1B) 
=[l  -g2B(81A  +I1gA)][  + 
dLBTl  kB  2  kA  kB 
glAI  A  2A +1B  91A  (A12) 
2kA  kA  kB 1  2 226 *  BILS 
The firm's problem is to choose employment in each period of a con- 
tract  to maximize a sequence of payouts of the form in equation(5)  of the 
text, knowing that its choice for L, influences wage rates in period 7+1 
through the equations (All)  and (A12) shifted forward  one period. 
The firm's dynamic first-order  condition with respect to LA  yields: 
L  b 
= 
[Vl4-1  + VLT  +  ()]A13)  b + 2v 
Comparing  equations (Al) and (A13)  yields: 
(i)  XA =0, 
(ii)  kA  b + 2 
(iii)  glA=2  =  g2A  =  vkA.  (A14) 
The parameters  for the first-order  condition for LB  are complicated  by 
the dynamic monopsony power; this first-order  condition  is: 
LT  =  1  [vL +  +  L-.+  b  b+2v  +  F  2  kB 
F6Og  -  +  (a -  W)],  (A15) 
al(1-r) 
where the parameter  0 is shorthand for (dWB/dL_,)  as given by equation 
(A12). Comparing  equations  (A2) and (A15) yields  the following: 
-FOt., 
(i) XB =  I 
al(l-f) 
1 
(ii)  kB = 
b + 2v + FO 
(iii) g1B =  vkB, 
glB 
(iv) g2B  =  -  (1 -  r  +  2gg1BF).  (A16) 
It is then straightforward  to calculate  values for steady-state  wages and 
employment  for both first (A) and second  (B) periods of contracts condi- Wage  and  Employment  Patterns  in Long-term  Contracts  *  227 
tional on a level of labor  adjustment  costs (the parameter  v relative  to b). 
The four equations (Al),  (A2), (A6), and (A7) yield steady-state values 
for WA,  WB,  LA,  and LB  given values for the g, k, X, and 8 parameters.  In 
turn, these parameters  can be calculated  (approximately)  from the set of 
equations (A5), (A9), (A10), (A12), (A14), and (A16). Results  for varying 
values of adjustment costs are discussed in the text and displayed in 
Columns C and D of Table  8. 
The text states that the dynamic monopsony power acts principally  by 
reducing the positive relation between employment in the second peri- 
ods of contracts  and future employment. This is revealed by inspection 
of the equilibrium  values for the g parameters  in equations (A14) and 
(A16). Consider the case of 8 equal to .25 (row 2 of Table 8). Absent 
dynamic monopsony, this implies values of .235 for all four g parame- 
ters.  With  monopsony,  g1A  and  g2  remain  at  .235; g1B  approximately 
equals  .235; but g2B decreases  to  .115. For 8 equal to  .5, glA  and gm are 
equal to .4; glB equals  .4003; and g2B decreases  to .185. 
If bargaining is between a union and many firms, none of which is 
particularly  large, then it is natural to view firms as taking the wage 
profile as given. This simplifies calculations  considerably.  Steady-state 
values for WA,  WB,  LA,  and LB continue to be given by equations (Al), 
(A2), (A6), and (A7). The g, k, X, and 3 parameters  simplify  as follows: 
(i)  XA = XB  0, 
1 
(ii)  kA= kB= 
b + 2v 
v 
(iii)  glA  =g2A=  glB  =  g2B  = b + 2v 
(iv)  1  =  32  =  82.  (A17) 
where 8 is given by equation (7) in the text. 
Results for bargaining  with many firms are discussed in the text and 
presented in Columns A and B of Table  8. 
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bargaining between a union monopolist and a firm that faces costs of 
adjusting  employment is developed that is capable  of accounting  for one 
of  these  stylized  facts.  The  model  has  further  implications  that  are 
shown  to be largely inconsistent  with observed  patterns of employment 
and wages  over the length  of contracts. Although  the answers  may not 
be completely  satisfactory, the paper raises interesting questions  concern- 
ing the relationship  between  employment  levels  and the timing of labor 
compensation. 
My comments  are divided  into three parts. In Section 1, I discuss  the 
stylized  facts documented  in this paper and argue that convincing  evi- 
dence is presented  for only one of them.  In Section 2, I comment  on the 
theoretical  model  used  to  interpret  these  facts.  Finally, in  Section  3,  I 
discuss  alternative ways  one might interpret observed  employment  and 
compensation  patterns  over  contracts.  In  particular, I argue  that  the 
evidence  presented  seems  not inconsistent  with  employment  being  de- 
termined as a part of an Arrow-Debreu  equilibrium where  the timing of 
compensation  simply  does  not matter. 
1. The Stylized Facts 
Two facts describing  the behavior  of wages  and employment  over long- 
term contracts are drawn from the data analysis presented  in this paper: 
(1) on average,  real wages  grow 1.75% faster in the first year of contracts 
than in subsequent  years; and (2) employment  has grown on average 3% 
faster in the first year of contracts than in subsequent  years. 
These  two  facts  are arrived at from  studying  data on  employment, 
wages,  and the timing of contracts for various manufacturing industries. 
Although  the facts listed  above were  obtained  from pooling  all of these 
industries,  results  considering  each  industry  individually  are given  in 
Table 5. This table shows  that the  front-loading  of wages  at the begin- 
ning  of  contracts  is  widespread  across  many  of  these  industries.  The 
wage  effect  is  statistically  significant  for 7 out of the  19 industries  and 
there are no significant negative  coefficients.  This result, that real wages 
are higher at the beginning  of contracts, is not surprising or controversial 
and is usually  regarded as resulting from the fact that contract wages  are 
not indexed  (or only partially indexed)  to the rate'of inflation. In Table 1, 
however,  results are presented  that show front-loading of wages is also a 
feature of indexed  contracts. 
The employment  effect  that Bils documents  is much  less  robust.  He 
does  find  that  the  first year  employment  growth  effect  is  statistically 
significant  when  all industries  are included  in  the  sample.  However, 
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industry  is the only  one  for which  the employment  effect is statistically 
significant.  This leads one to question  whether  front-loading  of employ- 
ment growth  is a feature of manufacturing  labor contracts generally or if 
it is only  a feature of this one  particular industry. In the revised  version 
of the paper published  here,  results from dropping  motor vehicles  from 
the cross-industry  sample  are included.  Bils finds  that in this case,  the 
first-year effect on employment  growth  is, in fact, no longer statistically 
significant and the coefficient  is close to zero. 
The hypothesis  that front-loading  of employment  growth is a feature 
of only the automobile  industry  is also supported  by the evidence  from 
individual  companies  given  in  Table 7.  In that table,  only  5 out  of 40 
companies  exhibit a statistically significant  employment  effect.  Of these 
five,  two  display  lower employment  growth  in  the  first months  of  a 
contract. The three firms which  do display  significantly higher employ- 
ment  growth  in the  early periods  of a new  contract are all part of the 
automobile  industry,  which  is  consistent  with  the  industry  results  in 
Table 5. Given that the automotive  industry appears to be a special case, 
it would  be  useful  to  study  this  industry  more  carefully to learn why 
employment  grows  faster at the beginning  of contracts in this industry 
but not in others. 
In  summary,  this  paper  provides  convincing  evidence  for  the  first 
empirical fact listed  above.  There is,  however,  little evidence  of a posi- 
tive first-year effect on employment  growth in manufacturing industries 
in general.  But there is certainly no  evidence  in this data that employ- 
ment grows  faster as wages  fall during the later periods of a contract, as 
predicted by some  models,  including  the one studied  in this paper. 
2. Interpretation 
The task  of  the  theoretical  section  of  the  paper  is  to provide  a model 
that simultaneously  predicts faster growth  in wages  at the beginning  of 
long-term  contracts  but  not  slower  employment  growth  during  the 
same period.  The model  is successful  in predicting  the front-loading  of 
compensation  but is  unsuccessful  in  explaining  observed  employment 
patterns. 
The model  studied  consists  of a number  of identical workers  whose 
preferences  are described by a constant opportunity  cost of working, c. If 
the real wage  is higher  than c, these  workers are willing  to supply  their 
entire  time  endowment  as  labor. The  firm is  assumed  to face costs  of 
adjusting employment.  This implies that the firm's demand for labor will 
depend  not only on the current wage,  but all future wages  as well. 
Labor is assumed  to be traded on a spot market each period; employ- 230 - BILS 
ment  is not predetermined  by the contract. Wages are determined  by a 
union  monopolist  that maximizes  the present value of total payments  to 
labor net of opportunity  costs,  exploiting  the labor demand  curve. There 
is  a  natural  incentive  for  long-term  (infinite  length)  contracts  in  this 
model  since  both  the  firm and  the  union  would  benefit  from  setting 
wages  for all periods  in advance,  hence  taking into account the effect of 
future wages  on current employment.  The possibility  of infinite length 
contracts is ruled out,  however,  and the union  is assumed  to be able to 
precommit  to wages  only for some finite number of periods  (two). 
A result obtained  from reasonable  parameterizations  of this model  is 
that  wages  are  higher  in  the  first  period  of  contracts  relative  to  the 
second.  This follows  from unions  recognizing  that, because of the adjust- 
ment costs,  lower wages  in the second  period imply higher employment 
in both periods  while  lower  wages  in the first period  only  affects first- 
period employment.  However,  the model implies,  even with adjustment 
costs,  that employment  is higher  in the second  period when  wages  are 
lower.  Thus,  the model  is able to account for the first stylized  fact, but 
not the second. 
In an attempt  to correct this  problem,  Bils considers  the  case  of dy- 
namic monopsony,  where  the union  negotiates  with only one firm. The 
intuition is that this opens  up an incentive  for the firm to lower employ- 
ment  in the second  period  in order to be in a stronger bargaining posi- 
tion. It turns out, however,  that employment  is still higher in the second 
period, but the ratio of second-  to first-period employment  is less than in 
the case  where  there  are many  firms.  Additional  evidence  against  this 
interpretation  is contained  in Section 4 of Bils, where  regression  results 
are  presented  that  do  not  support  the  hypothesis  that  the  first-year 
employment  effect is smaller when  a union  negotiates  with many firms 
or when  there is pattern bargaining. 
This  model  represents  a reasonable  first shot  at explaining  the  ob- 
served  pattern  of  wages  using  a  simple  bargaining  model.  There  are 
directions  one  might  pursue  to  improve  the  model.  In particular, an 
undesirable  feature  is that unions  are assumed  to possess  what  is per- 
haps  an implausible  amount  of market power.  In particular, one might 
expect  that unemployed  workers  are able to impose  some  limits on the 
market power  of the union  by exerting  downward  pressure  on wages. 
Thus, one might want to consider more complicated bargaining arrange- 
ments.  Another  possible  improvement  would  be to formulate the model 
so that finite length  contracts emerge  endogenously. 
I see  no  reason,  however,  to expect  that these  improvements  would 
enable the model  to better explain the data. This opinion is based largely 
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costs  of adjusting  employment  are important  (where  firm specific  hu- 
man  capital is important)  are more  likely  to display  stronger  first-year 
wage  effects.  Using  two  different  proxies  for the  importance  of  firm- 
specific human  capital,  no  evidence  is found  that this leads  to a larger 
first-year wage  effect.  In addition,  no support is found  for the hypothe- 
sis that these  lead to longer contract lengths.  It would  appear that more 
progress  might be made by considering  a different interpretation rather 
than improving  the current one. 
3. Alternative  Interpretations 
The goal of this paper is to explain observed comovements  of compensa- 
tion and employment  over the length  of labor contracts in manufactur- 
ing industries.  The view  of labor markets underlying  the analysis is that 
observed  patterns of compensation  are important for observed  patterns. 
That is,  not just total compensation,  but how  that compensation  is dis- 
tributed over time is important for determining  employment  levels. 
An alternative  view,  which  underlies  real business  cycle models  and 
other neoclassical  macromodels,  is to interpret real allocations  as com- 
petitive  equilibria  of  some  general  equilibrium  economy.  Under  this 
interpretation,  as long  as there are complete  markets and contracts are 
enforceable,  only  total compensation  for services  provided  matters and 
the timing  of compensation  is irrelevant.1 Although  one may suggest  a 
sequence  of markets interpretation  for a given  competitive  equilibrium 
(for example,  this  may  involve  labor being  paid  its  marginal  product 
each  period),  such  interpretations  do  not  affect  real  allocations  or 
welfare.  Observed  wage  series  clearly represent  some  state-contingent 
payments,  but  determining  exactly  what  these  payments  represent  is 
difficult. For this reason most applications  of real business  cycle models 
do not confront wage  data. 
I view  the empirical results presented  in this paper (ignoring the auto- 
motive industry)  as largely consistent  with an interpretation of this sort. 
The fact that employment  is essentially  unrelated to the pattern of com- 
pensation  over the length  of contracts can be interpreted as evidence  in 
favor of its irrelevance. 
Many  may  feel  uncomfortable  with  a model  that has nothing  to say 
about the timing of compensation  over time. Bils expresses  this opinion 
in the conclusion  of his paper. If one wishes,  however,  one can attempt 
to interpret what  the bundle  of state-contingent  payments  a given wage 
1. This does  not require that the equilibrium  be Pareto optimal.  There can well  be exter- 
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series  represents.  In the  case  of an Arrow-Debreu  economy,  one  could 
study  a particular decentralization  and  compare  the  relative prices ob- 
tained from the model with relative prices observed in reality. The decen- 
tralization chosen,  however,  will certainly not be unique.  For example, 
in work  by  Sargent  and  myself  on  straight-line  and  overtime  employ- 
ment  (Hansen  and  Sargent  1988),  we  studied  a  general  equilibrium 
model in which  the time-and-a-half  premium for overtime work emerges 
from  a very  natural  decentralization  of  our  model.  In addition,  there 
were other reasonable  interpretations  in which  workers do not get paid 
an  overtime  premium.  Of course,  equilibrium  allocations  and  welfare 
are the same no matter which  interpretation is assumed. 
The advantage  of a model  like the one in the current paper is that the 
timing  of compensation  becomes  determinate.  It is not clear, however, 
that this is necessarily  desirable.  Once again, in the example of overtime 
compensation,  there are industries  that do not pay a wage  premium for 
overtime.  In our paper, Sargent and I argue that an alternative decentral- 
ization  of the same model  appears  to be consistent  with  the compensa- 
tion  pattern  observed  in  these  industries.2  Consulting  Table 5  of  the 
paper, it is clear that not all industries  display higher wage growth at the 
beginning  of contracts,  although  it is common.  This practice is not al- 
ways observed  even among those industries with the highest percentage 
of  employees  covered  by  union  contracts.  Thus,  it  may  well  be  that 
observed wages  in these industries  are determined by precisely the same 
model,  but just reflect different state-contingent  payments. 
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contracts. Second,  employment  growth,  too, is greatest early on in these 
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contracts.  Third, Bils develops  a model  of a monopoly  trade union  that 
maximizes  an  intertemporal  utility  function  against  a simple  dynamic 
labor-demand  curve. This model  predicts (1) falling wages  within a con- 
tract, and (2) (probably) rising employment  over a contract. Fourth, the 
model  has  other  implications  (for example,  about  the  relationship  be- 
tween  the wage  gradient and the rate of labor turnover, and between  the 
wage  gradient  and  the level  of wages).  These  are rejected by the data. 
Mark Bils ends  by concluding  that what  we  need  is a different kind of 
model-possibly  one with contract curve equilibria. 
I shall go through  these  arguments  in turn, but let me start by giving 
my broad reactions. 
Point 1. I think the evidence  on front-loaded  pay growth  is convincing. 
However,  it is worth bearing in mind that the effect is a small one.  On 
average the real wage  falls only a percent or two through a three-year 
contract. 
Point 2. The evidence  on employment  declines  is much weaker.  Having 
looked hard at these numbers I suspect  the author is right; but statisti- 
cally there is not nearly enough  to convince  a skeptic. 
Point 3. Although  I worked  for a time on models  of this kind,  I believe 
that the monopoly  union framework is not the best way to think about 
trade union wage  formation.  This type of model says the reason union 
x has wage  y is because  the union  is so concerned  about marginal job 
losses  that it does  not want higher pay. I now believe this to be funda- 
mentally wrong.  In my view  the typical union x has wage y because it 
lacks the bargaining power  to do better. 
Point 4. It is not easy  to know  the right interpretation of Bils's findings, 
but the following  points occurred to me. One is that the author finds a 
saw  tooth  in real wages,  and this is the familiar pattern generated  in 
the nonunion  world of nominal contracts. If there are good reasons for 
it there, it should  not be surprising that those reasons could be at work 
also in the union  sector where  there is some indexing.  Next, why does 
pay  (or  its  growth)  fall  through  a  contract? If,  as  explored  below, 
workers  have  higher  discount  rates than firms, declining  pay may be 
optimal. Say this were the correct explanation for the paper's findings. 
Two kinds  of phenomena  could  then  be observed  at the end  of con- 
tracts. First, because  its relative  remuneration  is low,  the  firm might 
find  it comparatively  difficult  to  hire,  and  have  a higher  quit ratio. 
Second,  the firm might  prefer to delay its hiring decisions  for the last 
few months  of an expiring contract in order to discover the next rate of 
pay  it will  be  required  to offer. This would  explain  the observed  in- 
tracontract employment  declines. 234 *  BILS 
Turning to details,  consider  Table 3, and look at the left-hand column. 
This is compelling  evidence:  wages  jump at the start of a new  contract 
and decline  thereafter. This is true even  of indexed  contracts. Now  con- 
sider  Table 4 on  employment  growth;  again  look  at the  left-hand  col- 
umn.  This result is very much weaker statistically. 
As  Table 5 shows,  in fact, the wage  effect is positive  almost  always, 
and sometimes  individually  significantly different from zero (too tough a 
test,  thinking  about  the  appropriate  null  here).  For employment,  by 
contrast,  ten  coefficients  are negative  and  nine  are positive.  The  Bils 
result  is  being  driven-an  appropriate  word-by  SIC 371,  the  motor 
vehicle  industry. 
On more theoretical issues,  Bils's model assumes  that a union chooses 
to pay to maximize  discounted  labor income  subject to an AR(1) demand 
function.  Why would  a real union  want to maximize merely discounted 
income?  We know  most  unions  (1) do not make the necessary  internal 
cash transfers among members and (2) have layoffs-by-seniority  whereby 
the majority of seniors have a negligible  chance of losing their jobs. Why 
assume  labor demand  is AR(1) when  the evidence  is typically for AR(2)? 
Why assume  a union can set pay when  it typically has to bargain over it? 
As it turs  out, however,  Bils himself  concludes  against the model. 
The monthly  quit rate in U.S.  manufacturing  firms of over  1000 em- 
ployees  is  about  1.5%,  which  is  annual  turnover  of  about  a  fifth  of 
employees  per year. Think of the preferences  of workers at the start of a 
three-year contract. A sizable proportion know they will leave,  so would 
like to weight  compensation  forward rather than backward. I would  not 
expect  a big wage  gradient,  if only because  seniors  are likely to have  a 
disproportionate  influence,  but this is a plausible  way  to predict a little 
front-loading  of  pay.  If workers  have  relatively  poor  access  to  capital 
markets, that reinforces the argument. 
My  theoretical  interpretation  has  other  implications.  Wage  front- 
loading  should  be similar across sectors (because preferences,  not tech- 
nology,  are my explanation  for the wage  gradient); front-loading  should 
be greater where  pay is low, assuming  that capital market imperfections 
bite most there; front-loading  should  be greater where  turnover is high, 
for that is where  discounting  is effectively  greatest.  Bils's cross-section 
results are modestly  consistent  with these  predictions. 
Miscellaneous  points  are as follows.  (1) There is now  evidence  from 
Leonard  and  Blanchflower,  Millward,  and  Oswald  (1989) that  strong 
unions  depress  employment  growth.  Strong  unions  may  also  be  the 
ones  with  long  contracts.  (2) The regressions  are hard to interpret be- 
cause  entering  essentially  only  time on the right-hand  side  produces  a 
description  rather than a model.  I would  be pleased  to see more concen- Wage  and  Employment  Patterns  in Long-term  Contracts  *  235 
tration  on  identification  issues  and  direct  wage-employment  correla- 
tions.  (3) There is scope  for confusion  here between  levels  and growth 
rates, and I think more explanation,  particularly of the size of estimated 
effects,  would  be  helpful.  (4) Maximum  profit functions  are convex  in 
wages,  so  those  with  a taste  for such  models  might  use  this  route  to 
predict wage  variation.  (5) Intuitively  I wonder  about the robustness  of 
the  falling  wage  prediction.  A low  wage  today  boosts  demand  tomor- 
row, and it seems  likely that in some formulations  this might dominate. 
(6) The  closing  remarks-on  this  work  as  establishing  the  need  for a 
model without  a labor demand  curve-are  too ambitious. 
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Discussion 
Matthew Shapiro suggested  that labor demand may shift with the resolu- 
tion of uncertainty  in contracting.  He also suggested  that measurement 
error in  the  employment  numbers  may  explain  some  of  the  findings. 
Laurence Ball replied that Bils placed less emphasis  on the employment 
facts than the wage  facts. 
Robert Gordon suggested  that changing  the sample of the data might 
shed  light on the employment  findings.  Ben Bemanke  noted  that for 13 
industries  the effects  on wages  and employment  are in opposite  direc- 
tions. 
Olivier Blanchard suggested  looking  within  the manufacturing  sector 
at flows  into and out of employment  and particularly at the components 
of  accessions  and  separations.  Christopher  Ragan  noted  that  front- 
loaded contracts are not very new and wondered  whether  their presence 
was  due  to  strategic  reasons  or  just  incomplete  indexation.  Ball re- 
sponded  that  there  was  no  natural  reason  for incomplete  indexation 
when  wages  can be set separately for different years. 
William Brainard noted  that some  contracts are settled after strikes so 
the rate of discount  may differ between  the firm and the workers.  Stan- 
ley Fischer noted  that the workers may have different preferences  from 
their negotiators,  providing  another reason why  the discount  rates may 
differ. Ball responded  that different  discounts  rates across people  was 
not that appealing  an explanation. 
Wage  and  Employment  Patterns  in Long-term  Contracts  *  235 
tration  on  identification  issues  and  direct  wage-employment  correla- 
tions.  (3) There is scope  for confusion  here between  levels  and growth 
rates, and I think more explanation,  particularly of the size of estimated 
effects,  would  be  helpful.  (4) Maximum  profit functions  are convex  in 
wages,  so  those  with  a taste  for such  models  might  use  this  route  to 
predict wage  variation.  (5) Intuitively  I wonder  about the robustness  of 
the  falling  wage  prediction.  A low  wage  today  boosts  demand  tomor- 
row, and it seems  likely that in some formulations  this might dominate. 
(6) The  closing  remarks-on  this  work  as  establishing  the  need  for a 
model without  a labor demand  curve-are  too ambitious. 
REFERENCES 
Blanchflower,  D. G., N. Millward, and A. J. Oswald. 1989. Unionization  and 
employment behavior.  NBER  Working  Paper  No. 3180, November. 
Leonard,  J. S. 1985. Employment  Variation  and Wage  Rigidity:  A Comparison  of 
Union and Non-Union Plants, University  of California,  Berkeley. 
Discussion 
Matthew Shapiro suggested  that labor demand may shift with the resolu- 
tion of uncertainty  in contracting.  He also suggested  that measurement 
error in  the  employment  numbers  may  explain  some  of  the  findings. 
Laurence Ball replied that Bils placed less emphasis  on the employment 
facts than the wage  facts. 
Robert Gordon suggested  that changing  the sample of the data might 
shed  light on the employment  findings.  Ben Bemanke  noted  that for 13 
industries  the effects  on wages  and employment  are in opposite  direc- 
tions. 
Olivier Blanchard suggested  looking  within  the manufacturing  sector 
at flows  into and out of employment  and particularly at the components 
of  accessions  and  separations.  Christopher  Ragan  noted  that  front- 
loaded contracts are not very new and wondered  whether  their presence 
was  due  to  strategic  reasons  or  just  incomplete  indexation.  Ball re- 
sponded  that  there  was  no  natural  reason  for incomplete  indexation 
when  wages  can be set separately for different years. 
William Brainard noted  that some  contracts are settled after strikes so 
the rate of discount  may differ between  the firm and the workers.  Stan- 
ley Fischer noted  that the workers may have different preferences  from 
their negotiators,  providing  another reason why  the discount  rates may 
differ. Ball responded  that different  discounts  rates across people  was 
not that appealing  an explanation. 